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ABSTRACT 
Managing Merger Risk During the Post-Selection Phase 
BY 
Robert William Heller 
April 8, 2013 
Committee Chair: Dr. Pam Scholder Ellen  
Major Academic Unit: Robinson College of Business 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are an important part of many companies’ strategic 
plans, yet they often fail to meet expectations.  Part of this failure may be due to a lack of 
understanding of the risks present during the important period after the initial agreement to 
merge has been struck and the failure to apply a practical framework for managing these risks. 
The literature outlines many of the risks managers face and explains risk resolution techniques 
that can be used to mitigate these risks.  Risk management techniques or frameworks have been 
developed for use in projects involving mergers and acquisitions (M&A), construction, strategic 
alliances, software requirements development, distributed software projects, and post-merger 
implementation of information systems.  However, to our knowledge, no integrated framework 
has been developed to manage risks during the post-selection phase of mergers and acquisitions.    
In this dissertation we identify risks present and the risk resolutions available at this stage 
of the M&A process via a review of the literature and interviews with experienced managers of 
x 
 
mergers and acquisitions. We then develop a practical framework for managing post-selection 
phase risks in M&A.  We analyzed published case studies to evaluate the framework and confirm 
issues raised in the literature review.  Hence, this research contributes to the M&A and risk 
management literature by  identifying and classifying the risks in the post-selection phase of the 
M&A process, identifying and developing a classification of risk resolution actions linked to 
those risks, and providing a practical framework that can be used to more comprehensively 
identify risks and potential risk management strategies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are important to many companies implementing 
growth strategies and other company transformations. Other companies who may not wish to 
pursue M&As as part of their corporate strategy may be subject to unwanted acquisition 
proposals, competitors’ acquisitions of other key industry players, or pressure from public 
shareholders to participate in the M&A market as either an acquirer or target.    Even large 
companies are not isolated from the possibility of a buyout, as evidenced by the $46 billion 
buyout of TXU Corporation in 2007, the $32 billion buyout of HCA in 2006, and six other 
buyouts from 2006 to 2008 of companies with a market cap of more than $20 billion (Jenkinson 
and Stucke, 2011). For smaller and privately-held companies, being acquired may provide the 
most effective exit strategy for their owners to obtain liquidity. 
Despite the prevalence and importance of M&As, they do not work out particularly well, 
at least for the acquiring company.  Researchers have found that acquirer results are usually not 
considered good either by their management (Bruner, 2002) or by researchers (King, Dalton, 
Daily et al., 2004).  Overall, from a financial point of view, acquirers would often be better off 
foregoing the mergers they instigate. The acquired company does better, since its stock price is 
likely to go up after the merger is announced to reflect the premium paid by the acquirer (Bruner, 
2002).  
Researchers have sought to determine why M&A performance is so poor.  Antecedents to 
mergers have been examined to determine what characteristics of mergers might be moderators 
of performance. These conditions include deal characteristics such as payment type, deal type 
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997) and relatedness, managerial effects such as ownership and 
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managerial experience (Pablo, 1994), firm characteristics such as firm size and acquirer 
experience, and environmental factors such as waves and regulations (Haleblian, Devers, 
McNamara et al., 2009).  Generally the antecedents are not good moderators of acquisition 
performance (King, Dalton, Daily et al., 2004). 
 In addition, management may not have control over the antecedents even if they could be 
found to be helpful. For example, recognizing that it may be helpful to make acquisitions at the 
beginning of a merger wave is only helpful if management can recognize the beginning of a 
wave and is in a position to undertake an acquisition at that time. 
Jemison and Sitkin (1986) examined the acquisition process to explain M&A 
performance. Their work supplemented the focus on strategic and organizational fit previously 
used to explain acquisition outcomes.  They identified four process perspective issues that can 
negatively affect M&A performance: activity segmentation, escalating momentum, expectational 
ambiguity and management system misapplication. Others have identified many additional 
process-related issues that can impede the success of a merger. In this dissertation, we focus on 
the issues that arise during the post-selection phase, that is, after a merger has been agreed to by 
both parties. 
The post-selection phase of the M&A process is an important one for the success of a 
merger. The success of the integration and resource management of the companies is often 
determined by management actions during this period (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). The literature 
provides strong endorsement of the need for thorough due diligence (Angwin, 2001) and 
planning for the post-merger integration of the firms during the post-selection stage (Epstein, 
2004). Haleblian, Devers, McNamara et al. (2009)  highlighted the need for more understanding 
of  “the implementation of acquisitions, especially about how firms integrate, transfer, and 
3 
 
 
manage the resources of the combined firm, which underscores the need for greater focus on 
acquisition implementation in general” (p. 490). 
Some M&A failures have been attributed to the lack of risk management during the post-
selection phase of the M&A process (Epstein, 2004).  Specific risks to M&A success identified 
in the literature include corporate culture (Appelbaum, Gandell, Yortis et al., 2000) and delays in 
implementing post-merger integration (Epstein, 2004).  Harris (2007) sought to systematically 
determine the most important M&A risks for a particular company based on the experiences of 
their management team, but did not provide risk resolutions or a framework for managing risk.  
Researchers want to understand the risks and develop a risk management process for 
large, complicated corporate endeavors such as IT projects, construction projects and segments 
of the M&A process. A variety of methods have been used to guide managers in understanding 
and managing the risks in these types of projects.  These methods range from relatively simple 
check lists that remind managers of possible risks to more involved risk management 
frameworks that help identify, prioritize and resolve risks. 
However, the literature does not provide a comprehensive list of risks and resolutions for 
the post-selection stage of the M&A process, nor does it classify risks and resolutions in a 
manner conducive for use by practitioners.  Finally, the literature fails to provide a risk 
management framework for use in managing risks in the post-selection stage of M&A.  
In our research, we first developed a list of the risks that may arise during the M&A 
process and methods to resolve these risks based on a review of the literature.  We then 
synthesized them into risk areas and interviewed M&A practitioners to verify the risks and risk 
resolutions. We applied the resulting risk management framework to published case studies to 
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determine its usefulness in the M&A process.  The result is the first  risk management 
framework for the post-selection phase of the M&A process. 
This framework provides an approach for practitioners and researchers to use in 
evaluating the risks present in an M&A process. Using this approach, practitioners may be able 
to better assess the riskiness of a merger, identify appropriate risk resolution strategies, and 
improve future merger evaluations by documenting this how the framework could enhance or be 
adapted to their process . Researchers may be able to use the framework to help explain M&A 
process issues and outcomes, and to assist practitioners in applying the current knowledge about 
the moderators of M&A performance to the M&A process. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important part of the strategy many corporate 
managers use to grow their companies and increase company value.  In 2011, forty thousand 
mergers worth over $2.5 trillion were completed worldwide (Reuters, 2012).  While the quantity 
of mergers fluctuates cyclically as economic and market conditions change, the 2011 M&A 
activity represents an increase in the total value of M&A transactions from $829 billion worth of 
mergers in 1995.  
This trend illustrates the importance of M&A as a component of the corporate strategy 
toolkit.  Boosting corporate growth rates or pursuing corporate strategies via M&A is 
contemplated by many companies and implemented by a large number.  For example, in looking 
at the diversification programs of thirty-three companies over a thirty-six year period, (Porter, 
1987) found that more than 70% of the companies’  attempts to diversify were done via 
acquisitions as opposed to start-ups or joint ventures. Another strategic use of M&A is with 
corporate divestitures to rid oneself of underperforming units or focus resources. 
Even corporate managers not interested in M&A as part of their growth strategy may 
have to be prepared to be involved in a merger.  Publicly-traded companies may become the 
target of an unsolicited merger offer, and for private companies the sale of a company maybe the 
most viable means of obtaining liquidity for the shareholders.  
The terms merger, acquisition, and M&A are used interchangeably in this dissertation to 
describe transactions where a change of control in ownership occurs. This type of transaction is 
distinct from strategic alliances, joint ventures and partnerships that do not usually entail a 
change of control and often require little integration of existing company operations. 
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II.I  Frequent Failures 
Given the importance of M&A in corporate strategy, as well as many spectacular 
examples of M&A failures, researchers have attempted to determine if executing M&As is a 
successful strategy.  One of the spectacular failures documented in the literature is Quaker Oats  
purchase of Snapple for $1.7 billion in 1994, which Quaker Oats sold for $300 million in 1997 
(Hitt, Harrison and Ireland, 2001). The loss of up to $6 billion by AT&T in the purchase of NCR 
is another well-documented example of merger failure (Lys and Vincent, 1995). In addition to 
the large, well-documented failures, the literature shows that on average acquirers fail to achieve 
above average returns from their mergers.  In summary, when the acquirer and target are 
considered together, slight gains are noted in the short term (around the time of the merger 
announcement) but they suffer negative returns in the longer term (Bruner, 2002).  Merger 
studies differ in the measures used to evaluate success (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). The 
primary measures include abnormal returns, accounting studies, and managers’ evaluations of 
merger success (Bruner, 2002).  The literature conducted using these three measures shows that 
M&As in general do not work out well: that is, researchers have not found positive long term 
benefits from M&As.  
II.I.i Abnormal returns literature. The most prevalent measure of merger success is the 
abnormal returns metric, measured as compound abnormal returns (“CAR”) (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008). An abnormal return is the difference between the realized returns from a 
company’s stock compared to a benchmark return that presumably would have been realized if 
no merger had taken place. Its use for measuring short-term share price changes is based on the 
assumption that markets are efficient, that is, upon announcement of the proposed merger, the 
share prices of the acquirer and target will reflect all information available about the gains to be 
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realized in the future from the combination of the two companies. One reason the CAR measure 
is frequently used is because large samples of publicly available data can be obtained (Toschi, 
Bolognesi, Angeli et al., 2007). 
The long-term shareholder wealth effects from M&As have also been explored using 
compound abnormal returns.   Studies based on eighteen to sixty months of stock performance 
help answer the concern that evaluating merger results in the short term reflects only what the 
market indicates will be the results of the merger, but does not tell us if the merger achieved 
strategic goals. However, when used for longer-term studies, this approach has several 
shortcomings. One, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the merger from other effects on a 
company’s stock price when evaluating stock price performance over a long time period.  
Second, some of the calculations of benchmark performance suffer from statistical issues or 
shortcomings, such as the use of imperfectly matched firms for comparison with the merged 
company (Bessembinder and Zhang, 2012). Lamenting the lack of a viable benchmark against 
which to test, one researcher commented that “The fact that financial economists look at these 
articles as scientific fact is beyond belief.  There is simply no way to assess the long-term 
implications of an acquisition given the data that is available” (Shojai, 2009, p. 9).  Third, 
theories of stock market efficiency predict that any future gains to be derived from the 
combination of the two firms will be reflected immediately in their stock prices upon the merger 
announcement. If that is the case, one should not expect any abnormal returns over the long term 
since they would all be incorporated in the short term. 
  Meta-analyses of M&As show that, in the short term, stock prices of the targets in M&A 
deals show positive CARs (see Table 1 below).  Evidence for acquirer CARs is less conclusive, 
possibly reflecting concerns that the acquirer has overpaid or that any expected gains from the 
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combination have been realized by the increase in the target’s stock price.  The combined 
companies achieve positive short term CARs, which is generally attributed to an efficient market 
evaluating the prospects of the combined company favorably.  
Studies of CARs indicate that, in the long term, merged companies fail to outperform 
their benchmarks. These studies with a long-term focus usually analyze the period six months 
after the merger announcement to several years later.  Table 1 summarizes the results of five 
meta-analyses that evaluated  290 studies of the performance of over 200,000 M&As. The plus 
and minus signs indicate the authors concluded that the studies they evaluated indicated positive 
or negative CARs. The zeros indicate that the results were not definitive.  
Table 1 – Summary of M&A Meta-Analyses 
Focus of Study Time Period 
 Announcement Date Long Term 
Acquirer Returns +
K
,0
T
,0
M
,0
B
 NA 
Target Returns +
K
,+
B
,+
M
,+
T
 NA 
Merged Company Returns +
M
,+
B
,+
T
 -
M
,-
K
,-
B
,-
A
 
T= (Toschi, Bolognesi, Angeli et al., 2007)     K= (King, Dalton, Daily et al., 2004) 
M= (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008)  A= (Agrawal and Jaffe, 1999) 
B = (Bruner, 2002) 
 
II.I.ii Accounting studies. In the accounting studies approach  the financial operating 
performance of the combined companies is used to evaluate M&A performance over the long 
term.  These financial metrics include such measures as return on equity, return on assets, sales 
growth, net income, and profit margins. This method captures the financial performance of the 
combined firm after the merger is complete and compares it to the financial performance of 
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similar companies or industry performance.  A meta-analysis by Martynova and Renneboog 
(2008) reviewed 26 studies and found that 14 (59%) showed a post-merger decline in operating 
returns, and only five “provide evidence of a significantly positive increase” (p. 2168).   After 
finding that 21 of 26 studies, covering over 6,500 acquisitions, showed a decline or no significant 
changes in operating returns, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) concluded that there is little 
evidence that merged companies experience long-term improvements in operating performance. 
The accounting  studies methodology is limited in that operating metrics do not adjust for other 
issues affecting company performance (Lubatkin, 1983).  In addition, a merger may be 
successful in achieving strategic goals that are not reflected in a company’s financial statements. 
II.I.iii Management evaluations. Another measure of merger performance is 
management evaluations of the success of mergers, obtained either through surveys of managers 
or in the course of a case study.  Bruner (2002) reviewed ten studies that used managers’ 
evaluations of the success of mergers. Combining the results from those ten studies, we found an 
average of 63% of the deals evaluated were not deemed by company managers to have 
performed at an above-average level.  For one of those articles, the authors interviewed the 
managers of companies involved in 53 mergers in high-tech industries and found that only nine 
(17%) of the 53 were considered successful. The others were considered failures or their returns 
on investment were disappointing (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999). These surveys of practitioners 
provide insight into how those who are involved with mergers evaluate their success.  The case 
study method may also give us richer detail as to the reasons for a merger failure than other 
methods. However, both may be limited in their generizability (Bruner, 2002).   
II.I.iv Conclusion. It appears that acquisitions on average fail to provide much benefit to 
the acquirer.  Only the acquired companies appear to obtain a benefit from the premium paid for 
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its stock in the merger versus the pre-announcement stock price. The state of M&A performance 
can be summarized as follows: “Quite simply, we find no evidence that acquisitions, on average, 
improve the financial performance (e.g. abnormal returns or accounting performance) of 
acquiring firms after the day completed acquisitions are announced” (King, Dalton, Daily et al., 
2004 p. 195). 
II.II  Explaining Failures 
Given that large numbers of M&A do not appear to be helping companies, researchers 
have attempted to identify when value is gained in mergers. They have investigated moderators 
of acquisition performance such as how a deal is sourced, whether the form of payment is in cash 
or stock, and the strategic fit of the two companies (Weber, Tarba and Bachar, 2011). The 
potential moderators have been categorized in a framework set forth by Haleblian, Devers, 
McNamara et al., (2009) as: 
1) deal characteristics such as payment type and deal type (Agrawal, Jaffe and  
Mandelker, 1992); 
2) managerial effects such as managerial ownership and target management experience   
(Pablo, 1994); 
3) environmental factors such as waves and regulations (Martynova and Renneboog,   
2008); and 
4) firm characteristics such as acquirer experience (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999) and  
relatedness of the merging companies. 
Table 2 provides a summary of some of the conclusions reached by researchers who have 
used the moderators mentioned by Haleblian, Devers, McNamara et al (2009). 
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Table 2 – Potential Moderators of M&A Performance  
Category Antecedent Hypothesized Relationships Result 
Deal  
Characteristics 
Payment 
type 
When acquirer uses cash as 
payment for an acquisition, 
mergers will produce better 
returns than when equity 
(which management 
presumably recognizes as 
undervalued) is used. 
Payment type not significant in 
explaining performance during 
immediate term or one year periods 
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). 
Moderation of cash or equity use by 
acquirer  not significant in short 
term or long term based on 43 
studies with total sample size of 
7,325 ( King, Dalton, Daily et al., 
2004). 
 
Deal 
Characteristics 
Deal type Acquirers underperform after 
mergers but not after tender 
offers 
CARs are small and insignificantly 
different from zero, thus “no 
evidence of unusual performance 
from tender offers” (Agrawal, Jaffe 
and Mandelker, 1992, p. 1611). 
Managerial 
Effects 
Managerial 
ownership 
Higher ownership levels by 
management will lead to 
improved alignment of interests 
with shareholders and 
positively influence merger 
results. 
“In general, research examining the 
effects of equity holdings and 
incentive pay on acquisition 
behavior and performance has 
returned mixed results”  (Haleblian, 
Devers, McNamara et al, 2009., p. 
481). 
Managerial 
Effects 
Managerial 
experience 
Amount of CEO experience or 
firm experience with mergers 
may impact merger results. 
Moderation not indicated across 
seven studies which with total 
sample size of 1399 (King, Dalton, 
Daily et al., 2004). 
Environmental 
Factors 
Waves Buying during merger waves, 
which are periods with many 
mergers, improves merger 
performance. 
Some value can be created by 
participating in a merger wave, 
particularly if it is near the 
beginning of the wave (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2008; McNamara, 
Haleblian and Dykes, 2008). 
Environmental 
Factors 
Regulations Changes in regulations or 
regulatory events such as new 
interpretations of laws can 
change the returns from M&As. 
Regulatory reforms may have 
harmed bidder returns (Asquith, 
Bruner, & Mullins, 1983; Malatesta 
& Thompson, 1993) but may have 
been beneficial to target returns 
(Bradley, Desai and Kim,1988 ). 
 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Relatedness Resource, product or market 
similarity between acquiring 
and acquired firm may improve 
merger performance. 
No moderation indicated in studies 
with an event window at time of 
announcement (thirteen studies with 
2191 sample size) or up to five 
years later (six studies with 455 
sample size) (King, Dalton, Daily et 
al., 2004). 
Some studies have theorized excess 
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returns to acquired firm 
shareholders only (Barney, 1988).  
 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Acquiror 
Experience 
Firms with more acquisition 
experience will produce better 
returns from M&A. 
Results of initial M&As may be 
positive, followed by poorer 
performance on subsequent 
acquisitions, until the experience 
again produces positive returns 
(Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002). 
 
 II.II.i Deal characteristics. When an acquirer chooses cash instead of stock as payment 
for an acquisition, managers may be signaling that they believe their company’s stock is 
undervalued and they expect post-acquisition performance to be stronger than the market 
expects. If method of payment is a moderator of M&A success, acquisitions paid for with cash 
should outperform stock acquisitions. The meta-analysis by King, Dalton, Daily et al. (2004) and 
the later review of this segment of the literature by Haleblian, Devers, McNamara et al. (2009) 
both concluded that the empirical support for this theory was weak. 
 II.II.ii Managerial effects. Another explanation for M&A performance is the impact of 
management, including the level of managerial ownership and management characteristics. 
Although concerns related to agency theory and management choices arise when management 
ownership of equity and compensation programs do not align with shareholder interests, the 
research is not conclusive on this issue (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara et al., 2009). Other 
research examined management characteristics, including capabilities, knowledge, and hubris. 
Some research has indicated that management characteristics influence merger returns either 
negatively in the case of hubris (Hayward, Hambrick,1997) or positively in the case of previous 
management experience with the target via strategic alliances (Porrini, 2004). 
II.II.iii Environmental factors. Investigations into waves of mergers reveal that some 
value can be created by participating in a merger wave, particularly if it is near the beginning of 
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the wave (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; McNamara, Haleblian and Dykes, 2008). However, 
taking advantage of the beginning of these peaks in M&A activity requires recognizing that it is 
a wave and knowing that you are not nearing its end.  Having this information may also be of 
limited practical value to managers, as merger waves may not coincide with an acquirer’s 
strategic need for an acquisition or its management’s capability to conduct a merger process. 
II.II.iv Firm characteristics. Research into firm characteristics such as acquirer 
experience has produced mixed but potentially interesting results. In a meta-analysis of seven 
studies with a total sample size of 1,399, King, Dalton, Daily et al. (2004) did not find that the 
acquiring firm management’s prior acquisition experience was a statistically significant 
moderator of acquisition results after the announcement date.  However, Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999) found a U-shaped relationship between experience and performance, with 
early acquisitions by a team showing good results, then poor results followed by a return to good 
results. Their conclusion was that inexperienced managers improperly applied experience from 
their first successful acquisition to subsequent dissimilar acquisitions, while more experienced 
acquirers were able to avoid that mistake. Others believe that both individual and organizational 
experience may be needed to avoid integration problems (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).   
Those linking experience and M&A results have posited that experience in merging 
related businesses instead of unrelated businesses brings better outcomes (Finkelstein and 
Haleblian, 2002). However, Chatterjee (2009) proposed that previous studies, which relied on 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to measure relatedness, were not really measuring 
relatedness. SIC codes are four digit codes used to classify companies by industry. In 
Chatterjee’s view,  SIC codes  do not fully reflect the relatedness of companies or the similarity 
of the experience acquirers gain by serial acquisitions (Chatterjee, 2009).  He proposed that 
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companies with carefully developed and followed acquisition programs are more successful 
acquirers, and that simply making a lot of acquisitions does not lead to greater success. Instead, 
developing a process and gaining experience with that process is a driver of successful M&A 
results. 
II.II.v Process perspective. Since M&A results are not readily explained by the 
circumstances prior to the post-selection phase, some researchers have looked at the acquisition 
process as driver of M&A results.  This view “recognizes that the acquisition process itself is a 
potentially important determinant of acquisition activities and outcomes” (Jemison and Sitkin, 
1986, p. 145) and that “the content of the acquisition decision forms the upper bound on the 
degree of success that an acquisition can achieve, whereas the acquisition process affects the 
degree to which that potential is realized” (Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison, 1996 p. 724). Jemison and 
Sitkin (1986) identified four process impediments to acquisition success:  
1) activity segmentation - the segmentation of tasks which produces analyses with an 
emphasis on strategic fit over organizational fit; 
2) escalating momentum - forces pushing the process toward completion are strong and 
lead to inadequate or poor decisions; 
3) expectational ambiguity – uncertainty or differences in expectations of acquirer and 
target during the integration phase can lead to unsuccessful integration; 
4) management system misapplication – attitudes such as arrogance and defensiveness 
lead to selection of wrong management systems or applying them in heavy handed fashion. 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991)  added three additional problems which they found 
impact the integration process: 
15 
 
 
1) determinism – failure to adjust to the changing circumstances in an acquisition.  This 
problem is characterized by a “false sense of security” (p. 124) created by the original 
justification for the merger, and “confusion and frustration” (p. 126) as the situation after the 
agreement to merge does not match the original justification; 
2) value destruction – the environment of the merger creates uncertainty and fear among 
the employees. The employees’ personal negative experience translates into a failure to help 
create a successful merger; 
3) leadership vacuum – the involvement of the leadership declines after the acquisition 
when it is most needed, leaving operating managers to cope with the issues relating to capability 
transfers without the attention of senior leadership. 
Other post-selection and integration-related issues that impact M&A performance have 
been found, such as management of cultural differences (Weber and Camerer, 2003; Riad, 2005), 
the autonomy granted the target firm (Datta and Grant, 1990), decision maker agreement 
(Shanley and Correa, 1992), evaluation of organizational differences and systematic planning for 
managing them (Datta, 1991), marketing resource deployment (Capron and Hulland, 1999) and 
organizational restructuring (Barkema and Schijven, 2008).  Definitively settling the acquisition 
performance debate is difficult, and one research team lamented that “because of the lack of 
process level data typically available for a sufficiently large number of observations… prior 
research in this area has established few definitive findings” (Zollo and Singh, 2004 p. 1235).  
However, a few years later Lakshman (2011) concluded:  “It is now well accepted that aside 
from some exceptions, a remarkable number of failures in M&As are due to poor post-
acquisition integration” (p. 605). 
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II.III  Addressing Challenges 
The management actions that are available to produce better acquisition outcomes depend 
on the phase of the acquisition process. In the early stages of the process, when decisions such as 
which target company to pursue and what the goals of an acquisition should be are being made, 
possible management actions relate to the characteristics and strategic fit of the companies.  
After the target selection has been made and a tentative deal structure reached, which we call the 
post-selection phase, management attempts to affect acquisition outcomes must focus on the 
planning and implementation of the merger.   
The literature focusing on the period before the selection of a merger partner indicates 
that methods of improving M&A outcomes during that period are limited.  Managers can attempt 
to ensure a good strategic fit between the two businesses, hire managers with acquisition 
experience, time the acquisition for the beginning of a merger wave, and carefully evaluate the 
national or organizational culture fit between the two companies.  The decisions made in this 
period may be an important determinant of the outcome of the merger and set the upper bound 
for the performance of the merged companies. However, given the importance of the post-
selection process, and the difficulty researchers have had in finding effective pre-selection 
strategies to increase merger success (Shojai, 2009), much of the literature and this dissertation 
focus on the post-selection period. 
Researchers have proposed solutions to potential problems in the post-selection period:  
1) Managers should review their merger process to ensure it includes broadly defined 
activities such as establishing strategic plans for the merger (Shrivastava, 1986) and “installing a 
new sense of purpose” (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 p. 172).  
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2) Other researchers identified narrower issues which they believe are important in the 
acquisition process, and suggest methods to resolve these issues. Examples of this type of 
treatment are communicating to reduce uncertainty (Schweiger and Denisi, 1991), redeploying 
marketing managers bidirectionally between acquirer and target (Capron and Hulland, 1999), 
understanding the importance of leadership (Sitkin and Pablo, 2005), and appointing an 
integration manager early in the process (Teerikangas, Very and Pisano, 2011). 
3) Some researchers address their solutions to a specific industry (Maire and Collerette, 
2011) or for functional areas within firms such as information systems (McKiernan and Merali, 
1995) or human resources (Marks and Vansteenkiste, 2008). 
II.IV  Positioning of Research 
A variety of risk lists and other checklists have been presented in the M&A literature, and 
models for using risk management have been developed for other areas of concern to 
management.   However, we have found no research in the M&A field that provides a framework 
for using risk management techniques to manage the post-selection phase of mergers and 
acquisitions.  This dissertation provides such a framework. 
II.IV.i Process perspective. In this dissertation, the M&As discussed using the process 
perspective are those that require some degree of integration. These M&As are undertaken to 
obtain the potential benefits of integration such as operating synergies or increased market 
presence.  Hubbard (2001) describes the four degrees of integration that can occur when 
companies enter change of control transactions:   
  1) total autonomy policy – no physical integration of acquirer and target, control by 
acquirer strictly by financial controls.  The target operations remain as they were before the 
merger. 
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  2) restructuring followed by financial controls – financial controls are put in place, and 
the target company is modified via such actions as a change in management or more efficient 
asset utilization. 
3) centralization or integration of key functions – key departments or functions are 
combined to take advantage of economies of scale, and  
4) full integration – companies merged into one operation. 
  In the first two situations, the target is left to operate as a stand-alone entity and is not 
integrated into the operations of the acquirer.  In the latter two types of acquisitions some degree 
of integration takes place. Risks during the post-selection phase are different for companies 
undertaking some level of integration beyond financial integration than for those which are not. 
Given the importance of merger integration and the corresponding importance of identifying the 
risks and risk resolutions that come with integration, our research focused on the latter two 
integration levels. 
II.IV.ii Post-selection phase. This dissertation focuses on the risks an acquirer faces 
after the selection of the merger partner, here called the post-selection phase. The post-selection 
phase begins when the acquirer and target have an agreement to consummate a transaction.  
Their agreement may take the form of a verbal agreement, a letter of intent, or it may be reflected 
in a merger agreement. The final merger agreement usually is  binding, and may even entitle the 
target to compensation if the merger is not consummated (Davidoff, 2009). Although a letter of 
intent often does not bind either company to complete a transaction, at this point the strategic fit 
decision has been made.  Our contention, which is in line with the literature, is that the post-
selection phase begins the process of planning for and implementing the integration of the 
companies. Researchers maintain that  a significant part of the potential value of M&As is 
19 
 
 
created or lost in the post-selection phase, and some even posit that “All value creation takes 
place after the acquisition; hence the critical importance of the quality of the post-merger 
integration process” (Haspeslagh 1991, p. 15). Therefore, a tool that can be used to identify and 
manage the risks inherent in the process should be helpful to managers seeking to increase value 
creation in M&A. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW: RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
III.I  Importance of Managing Risk 
Managing risk is important in the management of organizations, especially when 
significant, nonroutine projects are undertaken (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008). In fact, some 
believe that managing risk is the essence of management (Das and Teng, 1998)   The importance 
of managing risk extends to the M&A process, given the degree to which the pre-selection phase 
expectations of the partners are realized depends upon the process used to implement the merger 
post-selection.  Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison, (1996) highlight the “non routineness, speed of 
decision making, and restricted use of information” of acquisitions which are “process-related 
contributors to acquisition riskiness” (p. 725). Thus, “it is important that we focus on 
understanding the characteristics of the acquisition process and the factors, including risk, that 
influence those characteristics” (Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison, 1996, p. 724). 
III.II  Description of Risk 
         We focus on definitions of risk that emphasize the relationship of risk to decision-making 
and opportunity cost.   Sitkin and Pablo (1992) described risk as “a characteristic of decisions … 
to which there is uncertainty about whether potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes 
of decisions will be realized” (p. 10).  Charette (1990) listed three conditions for risk to exist: 
  1) The potential for loss must exist. 
2) Uncertainty with respect to the eventual outcome must be present. 
3) Some choice or decision is required to deal with the uncertainty and potential for loss.  
     As is the case with studies of M&A outcomes, the appropriate measure of outcomes 
when evaluating risk must be addressed. Some outcomes are easy to characterize, such as when 
merged companies rapidly decline into bankruptcy.  We evaluate that situation as a failure.  But 
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there are M&As that do not result in as definitive a decline, but instead fail to meet other 
performance targets. These targets might be: earning more than the risk-adjusted cost of capital; 
operating performance at or above that used to justify the merger decision; returns to the 
acquiring shareholders above those which would have realized had the merger not occurred; 
achieving strategic goals of the transaction; or coping with an external threat successfully as a 
combined company.  We include in the description of risks those outcomes that make us worse 
off than the current position and outcomes which are not as good as some other outcomes that 
might have been obtained (MacCrimmon, Wehrung and Stanbury, 1986). 
III.III  Risk Management 
Organizations faced with process-related risks attempt to cope with them by the use of 
risk management.  Risk management is “any set of actions taken by individuals or corporations 
in an effort to alter the risk arising from their business” (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008, p. 35).  
Various authors have suggested risk management processes (Chapman and Ward, 2003; 
MacCrimmon, Wehrung and Stanbury, 1986; Boehm, 1991; Merna and Al-Thani, 2008).  These 
approaches vary in detail and flexibility, but they all address three components of the risk 
management process: risk identification; risk analysis; and risk response.   
1.  Risk Identification 
In risk identification, the risks that could impact the process are identified and their 
characteristics documented. Techniques to identify risks include: probing managers or experts 
via brainstorming, Delphi technique and interviews; assumption analysis; and risk registers or 
checklists, which are often derived from previous experience (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008).   
During the risk identification stage, a large number of risks may be identified, so risk analysis is 
used to determine which risks should receive particular attention. 
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2. Risk Analysis 
In risk analysis, the probability of loss and the magnitude of the potential loss are 
assessed for the previously identified risks (Boehm, 1991).  Risk analysis can emphasize 
quantitative or qualitative analysis.  Quantitative techniques “attempt to determine absolute value 
ranges together with probability distributions” (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008, pg. 56) for the impact 
of risks on the results of the project. Quantitative techniques include decision trees, Monte Carlo 
simulation, sensitivity analysis, and probability-impact grid analysis (Merna and Al-Thani, 
2008).  Users of qualitative techniques seek relative values as opposed to absolute values for the 
impact of these risks.  Qualitative techniques include checklists, risk registers, Delphi and 
probability-impact tables. 
Boehm (1991) developed a qualitative technique to analyze the risk exposure of software 
projects. With this technique, the level of risk affecting a project outcome and the amount of the 
loss are used to determine the risk exposure (RE) of a project.  This can be stated as the formula  
RE = P(UO) x L(UO), 
where P(UO) is the level of risk affecting a project outcome, and L(UO) is the amount of the loss 
which would result from the risk.    
After developing impact and probability estimates for each risk, managers can rank order 
them by risk exposure to assist in developing the risk management plan for the project.  This 
method has been used to study software-related project risks  (Boehm, 1991; Keil, Cule, 
Lyytinen et al., 1998; Persson, Mathiassen, Boeg et al., 2009), to evaluate risks between rather 
than within projects (Baccarini and Archer, 2001), and in post-merger IT integration by 
(Alaranta and Mathiassen, 2011).  
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Some project management scholars are skeptical of qualitative evaluations using the 
probability-impact technique.  They believe the probability-impact approach “delivers very little 
useful information and even less real insight” (Chapman and Ward, 2000, p. 294).  They object 
to the noniterative use of probability impacts. They maintain this may produce crude estimates of 
probability and impact which are then obscured when risk exposure estimates from different 
risks are combining into indices.  They are also concerned about the process used to elicit the 
probability and impact ratings from managers. Their concern is that the concepts of low, medium 
and high are not clearly understood to be the same by all the managers who are asked to use 
those measures in evaluating a project (Chapman and Ward, 2003, p. 170). 
Researchers who have used qualitative evaluations have recognized or attempted to 
mitigate these concerns.  In many circumstances, exact probabilities cannot be determined in a 
timely and cost effective manner, so a quantitative approach is not an option.  Exact probabilities 
may not be needed to guide management action, as the relative importance of risk factors may be 
sufficient to guide management.  Probability measures of risk and more accurate dollar measures 
of impact may be important in deciding which proposed project to pursue, as when providing 
sensitivity analysis or project profitability projections to the Board of Directors.  However, once 
a project has been selected, Boehm’s approach is often an appropriate risk management tool.  
Some researchers have also conducted an iterative process, during which the meanings of risk 
constructs are evaluated and refined (Persson, Mathiassen, Boeg et al., 2009; Harris, 2007).  
3.  Risk Response 
In the risk response stage, a plan is developed to eliminate, resolve or mitigate the risks 
where possible.   This can also be referred to as the risk control step (Boehm, 1991) or a risk 
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response planning phase (PMBOK Guide:2000 Chapter  11).  The techniques used in this stage 
include: 
1)  risk avoidance, which is removing a threat either by avoiding projects exposed to that 
risk or removing it from the project; 
2) risk reduction, lowering the likelihood or impact of a risk; 
3) risk transfer, shifting or sharing the risk with others through insurance or contractual 
arrangements, and 
4) risk retention, retaining the risk unintentionally due to failure to manage the risk 
analysis or risk identification stages, or intentionally in order to reap the benefits which come 
with bearing that risk (Boehm, 1991; Merna and Al-Thani, 2008). 
III.IV  Risk Management in M&A  
The logical model prevalent in risk management literature assumed that decision makers 
manage risks in a consistent manner by evaluating expected risks and returns, with only the best 
interests of the company and its shareholders in mind. Under this decision theoretic conception 
of risk,  “two decision makers viewing the same acquisition candidate… should arrive at 
essentially the same objective risk profile” (Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison, 1996, p. 730).  However, 
further research has explored differences between the logical model and actual management 
decision processes regarding risk management and M&A.  One such difference is when 
managers work to reduce their own personal risk, such as the risk of losing their job, by engaging 
in mergers whose returns do not justify the risk incurred by their company (Amihud and Lev, 
1981).  MacCrimmon, Wehrung and Stanbury (1986) determined that the decisions executives 
make in risky situations differ from those based strictly on the expected value of the possible 
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results. They also found that the risk propensity of decision makers, who they characterized as 
risk seekers and risk avoiders, influences their perception of the risk level of a decision. 
 March and Shapira (1987) showed that managers’ approach to risk differs from the 
logical model in several ways.  First, many managers do not consider the possible positive 
outcomes from a decision as an important component of risk, but instead focus on the negative 
possibilities.  If a manager is only considering a portion of the possible outcomes, her decision 
process is not using accurate probability distributions.  Second, managers view risk more in 
terms of the magnitude of possible losses than in terms of a probability concept. Third, managers 
do not view risk as something that is readily or usefully quantifiable, either using expected value 
or other constructs. Sitkin and Pablo (1992) noted that the likelihood of extreme outcomes are 
often overweighed by individuals.  They also theorize that the behavior of decision makers is 
guided by their risk propensity, another deviation from the decision theoretic conception of 
management behavior. 
Researchers have examined managements’ risk management decision-making in the 
M&A process. When  Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison (1996) looked at risk management during 
acquisitions, they found that managers in M&A situations use  risk responses mentioned in the 
risk management literature such as “exerting influence, developing additional decision 
alternatives, delaying, and risk-sharing” (Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison, 1996 p. 735).   
As discussed earlier, M&A decision makers often have to anticipate or respond to three 
characteristics of the M&A process: escalating momentum; fragmented perspectives; and 
ambiguous expectations (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison (1996) argue that 
responses to these M&A risks are moderated by the decision makers’ risk propensities. For 
example, high perceived risk in an acquisition situation leads to the use of risk adjustment 
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techniques, such as delaying the transaction or seeking more information. If the decision maker 
is risk averse, she will be more likely to seek to reduce the escalating momentum than a risk-
seeking decision maker.  Thus risk has been recognized as important in the acquisition process, 
the importance of the behavioral decision model has been established in the M&A post-selection 
phase, and the model has been linked to specific issues such as risk propensities and perceived 
riskiness.  It appears that managers in M&A situation do not demonstrate strict adherence to the 
logical model.   
Harris (2007) looked at managers’ risk perceptions of acquisitions made as part of an 
acquisition program.  Working with the management team of a company, she helped them 
identify risk constructs to develop risk profiles for past and future acquisitions.  By rating each of 
the four recent acquisitions in which the management team had participated, they were able to 
score the relative riskiness of each acquisition and identify areas where the risk might be 
managed during the acquisition process. They concluded that the twelve risk constructs they 
developed reflected the management teams’ perception of which risk areas were important for 
their acquisitions. They also concluded that this exercise would be more valuable if used as part 
of the acquisition process rather than to review past acquisitions. 
Alaranta and Mathiassen (2011) developed a risk management framework for IS 
integration in the post-merger phase that involved a four step process: 
1) characterizing the situation by evaluating the likelihood that identified risks may 
present themselves,  
2) analyzing the risks by using the management teams’ perceptions of the degree of risk 
presented by each risk item to develop a risk profile,  
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3) prioritizing the resolution actions to be taken based on the risk profile, and  
4) taking action by revising the integration plan based on the results of the previous steps 
in the risk management process. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This study sought to develop a risk management framework for use in the post-selection 
phase of mergers and acquisitions. We first conducted a systematic literature review to determine 
the risks and risk resolutions suggested for the M&A area. Next we synthesized the risks and risk 
resolutions into twelve risk areas and twelve risk resolution areas. We then interviewed M&A 
practitioners to validate the risks and risk resolution constructs.  Our next step as to develop a 
risk management framework based on the constructs. Finally, we  evaluated the framework by 
applying it using published case studies. Table 3 summarizes the research process we used to 
develop and evaluate the framework. 
Table 3 – Research Path to Develop and Evaluate Risk Management Framework 
Stage Dissertation Section Description of Stage Research Technique 
1 Chapter V Synthesizing Risks and Risk Resolutions Literature Review 
2 Chapter VI Evaluating Constructs Interviews 
3 Chapter VII Developing Risk Management Framework Analysis 
4 Chapter VIII Evaluating Framework Case Study Analysis 
 
IV.I  Literature Review  
We conducted a literature review to determine what risks and risk resolution techniques 
have been identified in the literature.  We also determined how risks and risk resolution 
techniques are currently linked in the literature.  We did this by conducting a systematic review 
of the literature based on concepts (Webster and Watson, 2002). Literature reviews have been 
used extensively in management and M&A-related research.  For example, Haleblian, Devers, 
McNamara et al. (2009) conducted a literature review of the M&A field.  In addition to the 
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M&A articles they examined, they took note of  twelve additional literature reviews which, while 
primarily focused on other subjects, included M&A as a facet of the review.     
IV.I.i  Identifying the literature. We designed the initial computer-based search to 
screen broadly in order to decrease the likelihood that relevant articles would be missed. We then 
found the relevant articles by reviewing the screened articles. Following the search strategy 
suggested by Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003), we identified keywords and search terms, 
determined the appropriate search strings, reported the search strategy in enough detail to allow 
replication, and developed a full listing of the papers produced by the search. The keywords 
chosen were “acquisition”, “merger”, “process”, “performance” and “risk.” The search terms 
chosen were words beginning with either “acquisition” or “merger”, so documents containing the 
plural acquisitions and mergers were also selected.  If any of the words “process”, “performance” 
or “risk” were found in addition to the “acquisition” or “merger” the article was selected in the 
initial pass. 
Our search consisted of all journals in the Web of Science database from 1992 through 
2011 in the business, management, organizational change and related fields. As such, the search 
was not limited to the top journals. The search was conducted in the Title, Abstract, and 
Keywords fields of the articles.  This initial search yielded 2,865 articles. The search parameters 
and logic for the keywords and Web of Science categories are listed in Table 4. 
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Table 4 – Search Terms, Parameters and Logic 
Initial search to yield 2,865 articles: 
1.Topic=(merger* AND risk*) OR Topic=(acquisition* AND risk*) OR Topic=(merger* AND 
performance) OR Topic=(acquisition* AND performance) OR Topic=(merger* AND process) OR 
Topic=(acquisition* AND process)  
2. Excluded non-business topics by specifically including only: 
Web of Science Categories=( COMPUTER SCIENCE SOFTWARE ENGINEERING OR 
MANAGEMENT OR BUSINESS OR ECONOMICS OR BUSINESS FINANCE ) AND Web of Science 
Categories=( MANAGEMENT OR BUSINESS OR ECONOMICS OR BUSINESS FINANCE OR 
COMPUTER SCIENCE SOFTWARE ENGINEERING OR OPERATIONS RESEARCH 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE OR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LABOR OR COMPUTER SCIENCE 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS ) AND Subject Areas=( BUSINESS ECONOMICS OR COMPUTER 
SCIENCE OR OPERATIONS RESEARCH MANAGEMENT SCIENCE OR ENGINEERING OR 
PSYCHOLOGY ) AND Document Type=( ARTICLE OR PROCEEDINGS PAPER )  
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI Timespan=1992-2011 
 
 The titles of the 2,865 articles were then reviewed for their relevance to: 1) mergers and 
acquisitions; 2) risk and risk management; and 3) to the post-selection phase of M&A. This 
review is listed as Step B in Table 35 below.   Because of the broad keyword search initially 
conducted and the many subject areas included, the titles of many articles indicated they clearly 
fell outside the scope of this review. For example, articles titled “Small business credit scoring” 
(Berger and Frame, 2007) and “Multiscale neurofuzzy models for forecasting in time series 
databases” (Kumar, Agrawal and Joshi, 2007)  were both identified in the initial search, but 
examination of the titles quickly revealed that they should be removed from the review.  
  When examination of the title was not conclusive, the article abstracts were also 
reviewed. The title and abstract reviews reduced the possibly relevant articles to 177.  We did not 
exclude articles based on their research methodology or design.  A further analysis by reading 
the 177 articles and applying the three criteria resulted in 123 articles of interest (Step C). We 
then sought to capture potentially important additional articles not previously uncovered, 
including those published before 1992. To do so, we reviewed the citations of the 123 articles 
resulting from Step B and evaluated any which were cited by ten or more of the 123 articles. We 
used the same criteria as when we evaluated the original 2,865 articles.  This added an additional 
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14 articles (Step D).  Finally, 12 articles previously not evaluated were added as a result of a 
review of articles encountered while conducting this research (Step E).  In total, 149 articles 
contributed one or more risks or risk resolutions. The 149 resources used are listed in Appendix 
A.   
 
Table 5 – Literature Selection Process 
Process 
Step 
Step description Change in number of 
articles 
Net articles 
A Web of Science key word search 2,865 2,865 
B Title and abstract reviewed to 
determine potentially relevant articles 
(2,688) 177 
C Reviewed articles for risk or risk 
resolutions 
(54) 123 
D Reviewed 29 articles referenced by 
ten or more of the 177 articles 
resulting from Step B 
14 137 
E Added articles found with relevant 
risks or resolutions 
12 149 
 
This search process had several limitations.  The Web of Science does not index every published 
research article or journal and does not cover articles published prior to 1992. Other 
combinations of keywords may have cast a wider net and yielded additional relevant articles.  
However, as discussed later, the articles chosen captured almost all of the risks and resolutions 
offered by the practitioners interviewed for this study, which provides some comfort that the 
literature search yielded appropriate results.    
IV.I.ii  Identifying risks and risk resolutions. We reviewed the 149 selected articles for 
risks and risk resolutions in the post-selection phase of mergers and listed those risks.  Our 
coding of each document started with any mention of risks which could impact M&A success.  
We then confirmed that the risk was relevant to the post-selection phase of the M&A process. 
We also looked for risk resolutions, and where the authors provided actions that could be 
considered a risk resolution, those suggested resolutions were listed next to the risks. We linked 
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risks and risk resolutions when an explicit link was proposed by the article’s author. When the 
author did not link a risk resolution to a particular risk, we linked them based on our evaluation 
of the similarity of the situations described by the authors.  In reviewing the literature we were 
able to use our experience in mergers and acquisitions to aid in risk and risk resolution 
identification and avoid off-topic articles and concepts. 
It is possible that we failed to identify some of the risks and resolutions contained in the 
reviewed literature. However, given the numerous times most of the risks and risk resolutions 
were mentioned in the literature, we  should have found any missed risks and risk resolutions 
elsewhere in our literature review.  In that event, finding an additional occurrence of a risk or 
risk resolution would likely not have changed our compilation or synthesis of risks and risk 
resolutions.  
IV.II Interviews 
 To determine if the risks and risk resolutions we derived from the literature were 
complete, we conducted semi-structured, focused interviews with five experienced M&A 
participants.  Our interviews followed the Merton and Kendall (1946) focused interview outline 
in that: 
1) Our interviewees were “known to have been involved” (p. 541) in M&A situations, 
2) Through our literature review, we had “previously analyzed” (p. 541) the situation. In 
their outline, Merton and Kendall (1946) suggest that the interviewer should have analyzed 
“significant elements” of the situation prior to conducting the interviews. We did this through 
our literature review and classification process. 
3) We prepared an interview guide based on our literature review, 
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4) The interview focused on the experiences of the interviewee to both test our previous 
conclusions and to “ascertain unanticipated responses” (p. 541), which in our case would 
be risks and risk resolutions we had not previously uncovered. 
IV.II.i  Interview procedure. We asked the interviewees to discuss the risks they have 
encountered in M&A and the risk resolutions that were most important for their companies.  We 
did not initially share the risks and resolutions from the literature with the interviewees in order 
to record their impressions without influence from our literature review.  
Interviewees were asked what risks they believe threatened or, if ignored, could have 
threatened the success of mergers they have managed.  We inquired about mergers which 
failed or did not live up to expectations. We sought reasons for the underperformance and we 
asked them what resolutions they have used to mitigate or resolve these risks. Only then did we 
ask them to comment on the list of risks and resolutions we had derived from the literature. See 
Appendix D for examples of interview questions. These interviews lasted for one to two hours.  
They were recorded and transcribed. 
IV.II.ii  Interviewees. The interviews were used to determine if the risks and risk 
resolutions obtained from the literature review have been experienced by M&A practitioners. We 
interviewed five practitioners who have been responsible for M&A transactions at a senior level.  
All interviewees have led management teams in M&A transactions in which significant 
integration of the acquirer and acquiree was planned.  All of the interviewees are currently 
involved with companies who participate in M&A. We selected interviewees with significant 
experience who would be likely to be able to recall risks and resolutions from numerous M&A 
situations in which they had been involved. We believe this provided us with a substantial review 
of our risks and resolutions, evidenced by the significant overlap between their unprompted 
34 
 
 
identification of risks and resolutions and those from the literature.  We did not attempt to 
provide a statistically significant sample of interviewees. Table 6 provides further details about 
the interviewees. 
Table 6 – Interviewee Summary 
ID Title Years of M&A 
Experience 
Type of Firm  Nature of experience 
A Chief 
Financial 
Officer 
10+ Distribution company Led deal team while company sold to 
publicly traded company. Led deal 
team while numerous acquisitions 
made. 
B Partner 20+ Management 
Consulting  
Senior manager at manufacturing 
companies involved in M&A 
transactions. 
C Managing 
Director 
15+ Private Equity and 
Investment Banking 
Senior manager and deal team leader of 
several companies both as acquirer and 
acquiree. 
D Managing 
Director 
15+ Private Equity Firm Led deal team or assisted in 
acquisitions or divestitures of over a 
dozen companies. 
E Partner 10+ Retailer, Distribution 
company and 
Investment Banking 
Integration Manager for numerous 
acquisitions. 
 
IV.III  Case Study Reviews  
 We reviewed four published case studies to evaluate the results of our literature 
review, interviews, and synthesis of risks and risk resolution categories.  Although we did not 
conduct the case studies ourselves, in our review of the case studies we followed the principles 
of case study data collection from Yin (2009, p. 114-122): 
1) Our use of the case studies in addition to the literature and interviews constitutes a use 
of multiple sources of evidence, 
2) We created a case study database to organize the data we collected from the case 
studies, and 
3) We have maintained a chain of evidence to allow observers to trace our evidence. 
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IV.III.i. Case studies. Given that this engaged scholarship research provides a 
framework to help solve a problem faced by practitioners, we evaluated the framework using 
case studies which featured actual, identified M&A transactions.  To select the case studies we 
searched Ivey’s database of publications. From the initial database of 5,886 in October, 2012, we 
eliminated those that were not written in English or were reports or articles and not cases (Steps 
B and C in Table 7 below).  Of the 3,754 cases, we searched those with “Merger and Acquisition 
Themes” and that mentioned the word “integration” (Steps D and E). Twenty-six cases met these 
criteria. Given almost all of our interviews with practitioners concerned M&A situations where 
at least one of the parties was North American, we chose to limit the possible cases to those 
categorized by Ivey as “North American and Caribbean.” Of the sixteen remaining cases, we 
eliminated eleven as inappropriate based on either their narrow focus (accounting aspects of a 
merger, IT integration), insufficient information in the case on which to conduct an analysis, or 
because the case did not focus on the post-selection phase. We chose four of the five remaining 
cases based on their focus on the post-selection phase and the amount of information concerning 
integration-related issues they provided.  The steps of the process are summarized in Table 7 
below: 
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Table 7 – Case Search Terms and Parameters 
Process 
 Step 
Step description Change in  
number of 
 publications 
Net articles 
A All Ivey Publishing Publications 5,886 5,886 
 
B English language only (996) 4,890 
 
C Selected “Cases” only (1,136) 3,754 
 
D With M&A Themes (3,653) 101 
 
E Keyword search “Integration” (75) 26 
 
F Chose North America and Caribbean articles (10) 16 
 
G Reviewed to eliminate inappropriate cases (11) 5 
 
H Selected cases with rich detail, focus on post-selection phase (1) 4 
 
 We evaluated the framework by looking at four case studies of companies developing 
their integration strategies for a proposed merger.  We compared the risks presented in the cases 
with the risk areas in the framework. We then compared the risk resolution strategies 
contemplated by the managers in the profiled companies with those developed for our 
framework. We sought to determine if the risks and risk resolutions and the framework we 
developed might have been useful in the risk management process of the M&As presented in the 
cases. 
 IV.III.ii Case descriptions. Table 8 provides a summary of each of the four cases used 
to evaluate the framework.  
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Table 8 – Case Descriptions 
Case Industry Size Description Reference 
Bombardier Rail car 
manufacturing 
Bombardier 
revenue $3.45B 
Cdn 
Bombardier (Canada) purchased 
AdTranz (Germany) to expand 
geographic scope, increase its 
competencies in some technical 
areas and complete its product 
portfolio. 
Merrison 
and Barnett, 
2004 
Deloitte Accounting 
services 
Arthur Andersen 
billings estimated 
$100Cdn to $180 
Cdn, combined 
entities about Cdn 
$1.1 billion. 
Deloitte (Canada) absorbed Arthur 
Andersen (Canada) after AA’s 
dissolution as a result of the Enron 
scandal. 
Seijts and 
Monk, 2004 
Dow Specialty 
chemicals 
Dow revenue $49 
billion, Dow 
acquiring unit had 
$650 million sales, 
Wolff unit had 
$500 million sales. 
Dow (U.S. based) acquired Wolff 
Walsrode (Germany) in 2007 to add 
to Dow’s cellulosic unit and 
strengthen its footprint in Central 
and Eastern Europe 
Heimeriks 
and Gate, 
2010 
Unity Stockholder 
transfer 
agency 
services 
Unity had $2B in 
sales 
Unity, (South Africa), purchased 
Delta (United States). The objective 
of the acquisition was to achieve 
gains through synergies, economies 
of scale, financial and marketing 
advantages, revenue diversification 
and reduced earnings volatility.  
Integration of the two firms’ 
numerous information systems was 
seen as a crucial part of the merger, 
but was a concern due to the many 
systems used by the two companies 
and the lack of compatibility of the 
systems.  
Haggerty 
and Fong, 
2009 
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SYNTHESIZING RISKS AND RISK RESOLUTIONS 
 
To synthesize the risks and risk resolutions into risk categories, we identified the risks 
and risk resolutions in the literature, categorized the identified risks and risk resolution 
techniques, and linked the risk resolution techniques to the risk categories.  
V.I  Conceptualizing Risks 
We conceptualized risks using Pettigrew’s content, context and process categorizations 
(Pettigrew, 1987).  We considered risk as per Charette (1990) where risk is considered to be 
present only when: the potential for loss exists; uncertainty with respect to the eventual outcome 
is present; and some choice or decision is required to deal with the uncertainty and potential for 
loss.    
Using Pettigrew’s method of analyzing organizational change by first dividing the areas 
to be investigated into categories of content, context and process of change, we categorized risk 
in the M&A process into those three areas. 
1) Context refers to the internal and external environment in which the firm operates, and 
could also be considered the “why” of change.   
2) Content refers to the area of the firm being examined, such as corporate culture, 
marketing or technical or functional areas. The “what” of change is addressed in the content area. 
3)  Process refers to the activity the firm is conducting to effect the change, which in this 
research is the merger process. Pettigrew considered process the “how” of change (Pettigrew, 
1987).      
Pettigrew’s framework was developed for the analysis of the “transformation of the firm” 
(Pettigrew, 1987 p. 658) including mergers. It has been successfully used to categorize risk areas 
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in post-merger integration (Alaranta and Mathiassen, 2011) , and fits well the task of 
categorizing process risks in M&A.   The following discusses the risks we found in more detail, 
conceptualized using Pettigrew’s categorizations, and synthesized into risk areas: 
V.I.i  Content risks.  
1.1 Systems Compatibility Risk 
A merger may require the integration of numerous systems. It is not surprising that two 
firms, having spent years developing their own operating policies, employee compensation 
schemes, and bricks and mortar facilities, would have developed management systems which are 
incompatible and difficult to combine.  The potential inefficiencies arising from the process of 
combining them can create systems compatibility risk.   These risks can be in areas as disparate 
as the factory floor (Zhang, Fleet, Shi et al., 2010), information systems (Stylianou, Jeffries and 
Robbins, 1996), the technology assets expected to contribute most to the value to be derived 
from the merger (James, Georghiou and Metcalfe, 1998) and R&D synergies (Slowinski, Rafii, 
Tao et al., 2002).  
1.2 Integration Bias Risk 
  This risk results when one of the merger partners dominates the integration decisions, or 
when one functional area exercises domination.  Examples of this risk include integration 
decisions made under the influence of hubris (Colombo, Conca, Buongiorno et al., 2007; James, 
Georghiou and Metcalfe, 1998), using underqualified consultants  (Slowinski, Rafii, Tao et al., 
2002) and imposing management systems on the target (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986).  Integration 
bias can also exacerbate systems compatibility risk, for example, when the acquirer assumes its 
management systems are superior  and that the fault for the inefficiency or difficulty in 
combining them lies with the inferior target company (James, Georghiou and Metcalfe, 1998). 
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1.3 Organizational Culture Risk 
The common assumptions held by a group, which help make up its organizational 
culture,  can lead to “…meaning, stability and comfort; the anxiety that results from the inability 
to understand or predict events happening around the group is reduced” (Schein, 1990 p. 111). 
But when an organization’s culture is upset, it may not be surprising for the corporate 
environment to change. And in fact the maladies attributed to organizational culture differences 
include shock (Bastien, Hostager and Miles, 1996), stress (Weber, Tarba and Bachar, 2011), and 
alienation and disconnectedness (Brannen and Peterson, 2009). Even when merging firms 
occupy similar positions in the same industry, such as professional service firms  (Ashkanasy 
and Holmes, 1995), or have the same position in the supply chain, as with merging retailers or 
manufacturers, organizational culture risks can abound.  Clashes can occur when the target 
employees fail to accept the acquirer culture (Pioch, 2007) or actively resist it (Gates and Very, 
2003). 
1.4 National Culture Risk 
Differences in the national cultures of two merging firms have been blamed for a variety 
of suboptimal merger results. The risks from national culture differences can cause problems 
when a common language is adopted for the combined companies and those who don’t speak the 
chosen language well are disadvantaged (Piekkari, Vaara, Tienari et al., 2005).  Language 
difficulties can also lead to communication failures due to nuances in linguistic patterns which 
go unappreciated (Irrmann, 2005).  In addition to language-related difficulties, national culture 
differences can impede learning (Reus and Lamont, 2009), create difficulty regarding 
compensation issues (Tetenbaum, 1999) and cause socio-cultural differences to cause issues 
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other than integration to take priority (Maire and Collerette, 2011).  Table 9 details the Content 
Risk Areas, Definitions and references selected literature support for the risks.   
Table 9 – Summary of Content Risks by Category  
Risk 
 # 
Risk 
 Name 
Risk Definition Literature Support 
1.1 Systems 
Compatibility 
Risk 
 
Merging firms have 
practices, systems, reward 
systems or operating 
policies which are so 
incompatible integration 
problems are created. 
Failure to realize value from technology assets  (130) 
Consolidation impacts factory efficiency (147) 
IS merger process not smooth (127) 
Functional integration is disruptive (121) 
 
1.2 Integration 
 Bias 
Risk 
Integration decisions are 
dominated by one party or 
by limited business, 
technical or functional 
areas. 
Acquirer hubris (37,72,98,83) 
Management system misapplication (73) 
Overuse of underqualified consultants  (123) 
Acquirer doesn't value acquiree processes and systems 
(97) 
Focus on cost synergies at expense of HR IT systems (23) 
 
1.3 Organizational 
Culture 
Risk 
Merger process or 
integration is hampered or 
resisted due to differences 
in corporate cultures. 
Corporate Cultural Clashes (20,24) 
Lack of acceptance of corporate culture by acquired 
company employees (108) 
Firms risk propensity profiles are different  (105) 
1.4 National 
Culture 
Risk 
Merger process or 
integration is negatively 
impacted by differences in 
nationalities, language or 
culture. 
 
National culture differences  (1,98,115) 
National cultural differences are tacit (99) 
Cultural mismatches individualism v. collectivism (27) 
 
Numbers in parentheses reference articles in Appendix A 
 
V.I.ii.  Context risks. 
 2.1 Customer Relationship Risk 
A context risk that may be faced by merging companies is one which relates to their 
relationships with their customers.  The company faces the risk that relationships with customers 
will deteriorate due to unanswered customer concerns about the impact of the merger (Anderson, 
Havila and Salmi, 2001; Burgelman and McKinney, 2006), customer alienation (Bastien, 
Hostager and Miles, 1996), and the departure of key employees who maintain customer 
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relationships (Zhang, Fleet, Shi et al., 2010). The integration process can also cause new product 
launches to be delayed (Graebner, 2004), which can create customer uncertainty (Homburg and 
Bucerius, 2005). 
2.2 Contextual Ignorance Risk 
Contextual ignorance can be a risk when the circumstances outside the company are not 
adequately understood by the merger partners, or insufficiently attended to during the merger 
process. While it is usually not advisable for a company to ignore the context in which it operates 
as it conducts its everyday business, to do so while undergoing the significant organizational 
change which may accompany a merger can be even more risky.  Contextual ignorance can lead 
to a failure to anticipate and counter competitors’ reactions to the merger (Gates and Very, 
2003), a belated realization that the merged company will not have a competitive cost structure 
(Cullinan, Le Roux and Weddigen, 2004), or a failure to take advantage of growth opportunities 
(Chatzkel and Saint-Onge, 2007). 
2.3 Adverse Behavior Risk 
Adverse behavior risk refers to employee behavior that negatively impacts company 
performance. This behavior can take the form of the top management team or other key 
employees leaving as a result of the merger (Napier, 1989; (Schweiger, Ivancevich and Power, 
1987; (Vermeulen, 2005). The employees who remain may resist the merger and the change it 
brings (Giessner, 2011), become disaffected (Chun and Davies, 2010), or allocate their efforts to 
seeking benefits for themselves, a practice known as rent-seeking (Meyer, 2008).  Innovation can 
be hurt if technical employees are not managed properly (Kreiner and Lee, 2000) or leave the 
firm (James, Georghiou and Metcalfe, 1998). 
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2.4 External Stakeholder Risk 
External stakeholder risks can be of concern when outside stakeholders do not support, 
understand or collaborate with the merger process. Instances when this can create difficulties 
include union relationships which negatively impact performance (Antila, 2006) and 
stakeholders who do not believe or understand the reasons for the merger (Vaara and Monin, 
2010). 
Table 10 – Summary of Context Risks by Category 
Risk 
 # 
Risk 
 Name 
Risk Definition Literature Support 
 
2.1 Customer 
Relationships 
Risk 
Customer relationships are negatively 
impacted by the merger. 
Customers and suppliers 
concerned about merger (7) 
Customer uncertainty  (68) 
New product launch delays  
(58) 
Customer alienation (20) 
 
2.2 Contextual 
 Ignorance 
Risk 
Contexts outside the company are not 
adequately understood or are 
insufficiently attended to during the 
merger process. 
Competitor  reactions  
(18,55) 
Business environment 
changes negatively (30) 
Existing relationships can't 
be changed (51) 
Emphasis on cost savings 
leads to ignoring or 
eliminating opportunities for 
growth (38) 
 
2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
 Risk 
Employee behavior due to the merger 
process negatively impacts company 
performance during and after the merger 
process. 
Merger syndrome causes 
negative employee reactions 
(28) 
Loss of talent (23) 
Disaffected group of 
employees (41) 
Merger survivors coping 
difficulty (53) 
Reallocated effort to rent-
seeking (95) 
2.4 External Stakeholder 
Risk 
Outside stakeholders do not support, 
understand or collaborate with the 
process. 
Competitor reactions during 
our merger (20) 
Union relationships 
negatively impact 
performance (9) 
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Acquirer team perceived by 
acquired e/e to lack authority 
(50) 
Uncooperative target 
management during due 
diligence (45) 
 
V.I.iii  Process risks. 
 3.1 Process Management Risk 
Mergers requiring integration undergo some formal or informal process to combine the 
two companies. Inadequate management of this merger process, or process management risk, is 
the focus of many analyses in the literature.  This risk encompasses a wide variety of 
management sins which can lead to merger process problems ranging from inefficiencies to 
failure.  Risk arises when employees allocate too much time to the post-merger integration 
process (Meyer, 2008) or the merger process disrupts the normal work cycle or occurs during the 
busy season (Greenwood, Hinings and Brown, 1994).  Diversion of management attention can 
retard post-acquisition growth (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2009) or detract from the company’s 
emphasis on its core mission (Yu, Engleman and Van de Ven, 2005).   Poor integration 
performance can be the result of a failure to consistently and actively manage the integration 
process (Bannert and Tschirky, 2004; Ashkenas and Francis, 2000) as well as using the wrong 
integration approach (Al-Laham, Schweizer and Amburgey, 2010).  When managers of the 
process fail to provide sufficient about the tasks at hand and evaluate subordinate performance 
the process can suffer from “information constipation” (Bastien, Hostager and Miles, 1996 p. 
265). 
3.2 Integration Timing 
Integration timing risks are present when inadequate attention is paid to the timeliness of 
the planning and implementation of the integration.  The importance of proper management of 
45 
 
 
timing is illustrated by concerns that integration can go too fast when the companies do not know 
each other well before the merger (Al-Laham, Schweizer and Amburgey, 2010) or teams have 
not been coached well on how to work together (Miles and Bennett, 2008).  Conversely, a slow 
integration process can exacerbate “merger syndrome,” which is a plague of fear and uncertainty 
among employees of acquired firms (Marks and Mirvis, 1985; Colombo, Conca, Buongiorno et 
al., 2007).  In addition to the risk that the process will go too fast or too slow, mergers can also 
suffer from inadequate or delayed planning of the process (Ashkanasy and Holmes, 1995; Aiello 
and Watkins, 2000; Calori, Lubatkin and Very, 1994).  Finally, “escalating momentum” can lead 
to less than adequate consideration of integration issues and premature conclusions (Jemison and 
Sitkin, 1986).  
 3.3 Resources Shortfall Risk 
During the merger processes, new merger-related tasks are undertaken at both companies.  
At the same time, many of the routine activities of the firm must continue as before.  Some of 
these ongoing activities are made even more time-consuming and difficult due to the impact of 
the merger.  As a result of this limited slack, there may be too little management talent for the 
integration tasks (Kitching, 1967) or the integration team may be too small (Vester, 2002).   
Resources shortfall risk can also manifest themselves as task overload (Bastien, Hostager and 
Miles, 1996), implementing too many value creating strategies simultaneously (Ambrosini, 
Bowman and Schoenberg, 2011), or too much integration leading to too little slack (Shaver, 
2006). Regardless of how they are characterized, this mismatch between tasks and resources can 
lead to a failure to achieve economies of scope (Gary, 2005), inhibit knowledge transfer (Azan 
and Sutter, 2010), or overwhelm the HR function (Vester, 2002). 
3.4 Political Escalation Risk 
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Political escalation risk occurs when significant political struggles develop over which 
company’s management systems to use.  Examples of these management systems include 
processes, practices and computer systems.  Political escalation can occur as a result of 
preference being given to the acquirer’s employees (Allred, Boal and Holstein, 2005), when 
reductions in force are not evaluated as fair (Buono, 2003), or when acquired company managers 
are given excessive autonomy (Meyer, 2008).   It can manifest itself as an integration sabotaged 
by cliques (Miles and Bennett, 2008), resistance to change (Lupina-Wegener, Schneider and van 
Dick, 2011; Vaara, 2003) or destructive effects on the integration process (Weber, 1996). 
Table 11 – Summary of Process Risks by Category 
  Process Risks  
Risk 
 # 
Risk 
 Name 
Risk Definition Literature Support 
3.1 Process Management 
Risk 
Inadequate management 
action or leadership of 
the merger process leads 
to a significant departure 
from merger goals. 
Failure to plan for integration during due diligence 
period (2) 
Due diligence lack of detail (2) 
Escalating commitment or overcommitment (65) 
Wrong integration approach (4) 
Integration process difficult (137) 
 
3.2 Integration Timing 
Risk 
Timeliness of the 
planning for and 
implementation of the 
integration is inadequate. 
Escalating momentum leads to premature conclusions 
(73) 
Speed of integration too fast (4,10) 
Integration slow and costly (12) 
Integration process stalled (114) 
Delayed Integration Planning (32) 
3.3 Resources Shortfall 
Risk 
There is insufficient 
slack, resources or skills 
to properly prosecute the 
integration program or 
realize expected benefits 
of the merger 
Overintegration leads to too little slack (119) 
Insufficient size of integration team (138) 
Task overload (20) 
Too little management talent for integration task (74) 
 
 
47 
 
 
3.4 Political Escalation 
Risk 
Political struggles over 
which company’s 
management systems to 
use 
Excessive autonomy - acquired managers fight to 
retain independence (95) 
Lack of common purpose between acquirer and 
acquiree (92) 
Integration sabotaged by cliques (98) 
Not-invented here syndrome (138) 
Preference given to acquirer company employees (5) 
 
V.II  Conceptualizing Risk Resolution Techniques 
 Risk resolution techniques were mentioned over four hundred times in the reviewed 
literature, counting duplicate mentions of the same or similar techniques in different sources. The 
following sections present a summary of the risk resolution techniques using the Content, 
Context and Process categories.    
  V.II.i  Content. Risk resolutions related to content risks are focused mostly on what 
should be done during the merger process.  The resolution strategies are to: analyze and design 
systems early; adopt a systematic evaluation process; plan and cultivate collaboration; and 
manage cultural diversity. For many companies, a merger is an unusual event, so the planning 
and control mechanisms routinely used within the company for their business may not be 
relevant.  To counteract this, several of the risk resolution techniques proposed for content-
related risks call for developing a program designed on a case-specific basis to address the risks 
(Slowinski, Rafii, Tao et al., 2002; Colombo, Conca, Buongiorno et al., 2007), developing an 
integration tracking process (Gates and Very, 2003) and carefully codify the process (Zollo and 
Singh, 2004; Zollo, 2009). 
All four of the content risks have at least one resolution action advising that managers should be 
involved earlier in the process, such as the R&D manager for technical acquisitions (Slowinski, 
Rafii, Tao et al., 2002), IS personnel in pre-merger planning (Stylianou, Jeffries and Robbins, 
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1996), operating managers on the integration team (Marks and Mirvis, 2001), and HR managers 
involved early (Tetenbaum, 1999). 
 V.II.ii  Context.  One set of resolution techniques for context risks encourages early 
engagement with important constituencies such as employees with key customer relationships, 
customers, competitors, suppliers and unions (Zhang, Fleet, Shi et al., 2010; James, Georghiou 
and Metcalfe, 1998; Slowinski, Rafii, Tao et al., 2002; Antila, 2006).   The form and substance 
of communications are also addressed, as with advice to communicate the purpose of the merger 
frequently (Pablo, 1994), to vary communications strategies for certain constituencies (Chun and 
Davies, 2010), for managers to tell the truth (Schweiger, Ivancevich and Power, 1987), and to 
consider these communications to be on ongoing process and not a one-time event (Vaara and 
Monin, 2010). 
 V.II.iii  Process. The resolutions for the process risk category highlighted the importance 
of the integration and leadership teams, including their role, composition, and the timing of their 
formation and dissolution.  These resolutions suggest the appointment of an integration manager 
as well as a dedicated merger integration team or mini-integration teams (Ashkenas and Francis, 
2000; Vester, 2002). The integration team should include key employees of the target (Raukko, 
2009), including additional human resources staff (Vester, 2002).  A strategic leadership team 
should be appointed immediately and integration teams should be maintained well after the 
merger date (Burgelman and McKinney, 2006).  The integration process should be systematic 
(Shrivastava, 1986) and a merger intent document should be prepared which outlines 
expectations and holds people accountable (Ashkenas, Francis and Heinick, 2011). 
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V.III  Risks and Risk Resolution Techniques Linked 
  We linked resolution techniques from the literature to the risk factors. We first looked for 
resolutions that were linked to specific risks in the literature, and used these linkages when they 
were found.  When a resolution was listed without explicitly naming the accompanying risk, we 
linked to the risk which through intuition we understood the author was referring. Table 12 
provides the resolution strategies for each risk area as well as exemplary actions which the 
literature recommends as risk resolutions.  The numbers in parentheses in the Exemplar Actions 
column reference the literature from which each action was derived via reference to Appendix A. 
Table 12 – Risk Resolution Strategies and Exemplar Actions 
Risk 
# 
Risk Name Resolution Strategy Exemplar Actions 
 Content Risks  
1.1 Systems 
Compatibility  
 
 
Analyze and design systems 
early 
Deliberate codification of the process (149) 
Integration manager respects acquiree talent 
and assets (130) 
Evaluate target technology portfolio with same 
tools used to manage acquirer’s systems (123) 
Evaluate degree of integration desired 
carefully 
Involve R&D manager early in planning for 
technical acquisitions (123) 
Include IS personnel in pre-merger planning 
(127) 
1.2 Integration 
 Bias  
 
 
Adopt systematic 
evaluation process 
Consider implications of both companies’ 
technologies (72) 
Evaluate “treasured assets” of target (98) 
Provide target with some autonomy (97) 
Empower target managers (42) 
Be aware of mindset of target ((92) 
Operating managers on integration team (92) 
Adjust integration process on case-by-case 
basis (43) 
Insist that consultants have hands on 
experience and knowhow (123) 
1.3 Organizational  
Culture  
 
 
Plan and cultivate 
collaboration 
Increase interdependence and connectivity 
among employees (82) 
Create tasks on which members from both 
companies can collaborate(141) 
Encourage employees to develop informal ties 
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and social relationships (115) 
Involve employees in managing process (140) 
Develop integration tracking process. (55). 
Make overall appointments and other choices 
equally, demonstrate integrative equality (47) 
Increase autonomy of HR managers (143) 
Celebrate small victories (140) 
Senior managers actively communicate their 
values, beliefs and norms to staff (123) 
 
1.4 National 
Culture  
 
 
Manage national cultural 
diversity 
Acknowledge differences, adequate 
distribution of tasks, mutual respect (17) 
Have cultural integration program involving 
interaction and working together on projects 
(123) 
Provide cultural training to staff of both 
companies(123) 
Assign managers from target to home office 
(12) 
Recognize that national culture differences 
lead to communication failures (71) 
Reinforce integrative roles to bridge cultural 
gaps (hire consultants or assign task forces) 
(136) 
Acquirer exerts less formal control, develop 
informal control and coordination (32) 
Managers’ opinions as to integration process 
obtained during process (99) 
Conduct cultural audit of target (131) 
Senior HR leader and Integration Manager 
involved early (131) 
 Context Risks  
2.1 Customer  
Relationship  
 
 
Implement strategies to 
maintain marketing 
momentum 
Develop strategy before execution of 
integration (30) 
Develop integration tracking process (55) 
Evaluate brand equity decisions as part of 
merger process (79) 
Retain key employees who maintain customer 
relationships (147)  
Include customers in the process (20) 
Speedy integration of market-related aspects of 
merger (68) 
Delay post-merger integration until after 
product launch (59) 
2.2 Contextual 
 Ignorance  
 
 
Engage and inform key 
stakeholders 
 Revise plan and stakeholder expectations (30) 
Develop integration tracking process to 
include competitor reactions (55) 
Use secondary sources (suppliers, customers, 
former employees) to evaluate target 
technology (72) 
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2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
 
 
Aggressively manage 
employee relations 
Communicate purpose of merger and merger 
plan early and often (104) 
Vary communication and integration strategies 
for physically remote employees (41) 
Don’t marginalize target employees  (5) 
Forge social connections between two 
companies (13) 
Managers tell the truth and have empathy for 
employees (118) 
Provide certainty by eliminating post-merger 
autonomy of target (85) 
Choose leaders from both companies (136) 
Make decisions quickly and fairly (procedural 
justice) (132) 
Carefully hire and train integration managers 
capable of dealing with conflict (42) 
Grant reasonable autonomy to target firm 
managers (121) 
Integrate people before integrating tasks (22) 
Understand differences in ethical attitudes 
(Interviewee B) 
 
2.4 External  
Stakeholder  
 
 
Mobilize external 
stakeholders 
Proactively work with customers and suppliers 
(123) 
Retain key employees who maintain 
relationships (147) 
Communications to legitimate merger should 
be ongoing process, not one-time event (134) 
Build relationships with unions (9) 
Avoid long pre-acquisition phase (2) 
Proactively initiate contact with regulatory 
agencies (Interviewee A) 
 Process Risks  
3.1 Process 
Management  
 
 
Continuously plan and 
reorganize process 
Prepare “merger intent” document outlining 
expectations for the deal and holding people 
accountable (11) 
Establish new strategic leadership team 
immediately (121) 
Appointment  Integration Manager (11) 
Have dedicated merger integration team (25) 
Selective participation – not everyone 
participates in process directly (95) 
Long term strategy communicated to all 
organizational members (121) 
Maintain integration team well after merger 
date (30) 
Develop and implement a systemic integration 
process (16) 
3.2 Integration 
 Timing  
Monitor and adapt timing Carefully evaluate combined teams’ ability to 
manage pace of change (98) 
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Integrate at proper speed (4) 
Exploit negotiation phase to increase 
knowledge base and plan integration activities 
(43) 
Manage employee expectations of pace of 
change (11) 
Key target employees should have significant 
role in integration (111) 
Develop standards as to how teams will work 
together (98) 
3.3 Resources 
 Shortfall  
 
 
Ensure and monitor 
appropriate resources 
Transfer more resources to effort (97) 
Plan for maintaining organizational slack (54) 
Maintain more resources after integration 
(119) 
Create mini-integration teams (138) 
Bring in additional HR staff to help with 
merger process (138) 
Embark on projects appropriate for new scale 
(14) 
3.4 Political 
Escalation  
 
 
Implement processes for  
conflict resolution 
 Base choices of management on competence 
criteria (95) 
 Predetermine positions during pre-merger 
phase (95) 
 Have resolution mechanisms in place (95) 
 Manage conflict constructively from very 
beginning (98) 
 Develop short term goals which require entire 
team to work together (98) 
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EVALUATING CONSTRUCTS 
We evaluated the risk and risk resolution lists and our constructs of twelve risk areas and 
twelve risk resolutions by interviewing M&A practitioners.  Our goal was to determine if the 
risks and resolutions detailed by the interviewees without prompting of the risks and resolutions 
we had synthesized from the literature would be consistent with our risk and resolution lists and 
our categorization of them.  
 The risks and risk resolutions described in the literature were generally consistent with 
those mentioned by the interviewees.  Every risk factor we synthesized from the literature was 
mentioned unprompted by at least one of the interviewees.  And, with few exceptions, all of the 
risks the interviewees mentioned were included in the risk factors we derived from the literature.  
Table 13 below details the number of risks and risk resolutions mentioned by interviewees. 
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Table 13 – Interview Risks and Risk Resolutions Matched to Literature 
Risk # Risk Name Risks Resolutions 
1.1 Systems 
Compatibility 
1 2 
1.2 Integration 
 Bias 
2 3 
1.3 Organizational 
Culture 
3 2 
1.4 National Culture 1 0 
2.1 Customer  
Relationship 
4 4 
2.2 Contextual  
Ignorance 
3 2 
2.3 Adverse Behavior 4 4 
2.4 External Stakeholder 2 2 
3.1 Process Management  3 4 
3.2 Integration Timing  3 3 
3.3 Resources  Shortfall  4 4 
3.4 Political Escalation  2 2 
Other  2 2 
 
The importance of the category adverse behavior was evident in the frequency with 
which it was mentioned in the interviews and the literature.  The interviewees demonstrated a 
concern and empathy for the employees, as when Interviewee A noted “[acquired employees] are 
always scared of what you are going to bring them.” Interviewee B offered as a resolution to 
Adverse Behavior of acquirer that “you [owners] might want to bonus your guys [management], 
because they know you are making a ton of money.” 
One risk mentioned by interviewees but which was difficult to categorize in our risk list 
from the literature was the risk created by differences in ethics among the participants. 
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Interviewee E commented that by being honest and truthful in dealing with employees of the 
acquired company “it is amazing what you can accomplish even in a difficult environment.”  
Interviewee B described a selling shareholder’s failure to reward key employees of the acquired 
company.  He identified this as an ethics failure which created risks for the integration of the 
companies.  We have categorized these two comments in the “Other” category in Table 7. We 
would categorize this as an Adverse Behavior Risk on the assumption that these ethical failures 
increased the risk that employees would exhibit adverse behavior. It is possible that these 
examples from the interviewees could be categorized as differences in organizational culture, but 
we felt that Adverse Behavior was the best fit.  
One of the exemplar risk resolutions from the literature which we categorized as an 
Adverse Behavior resolution was that managers tell the truth and have empathy for employees 
(Schweiger, Ivancevich and Power, 1987).  This may serve as a risk resolution in this case of 
management not being honest or truthful, or if management does not having the empathy to 
understand that the owner’s good fortune in selling his company may cause resentment among 
employees if it is not shared.    
Another risk mentioned by interviewees which was not in the literature was government 
regulations or regulatory issues.  Interviewee A’s company is highly regulated. Obtaining 
government licensing approvals and transfers is a requirement for them to complete any 
acquisition. They resolve this issue by keeping an attorney on retainer who alerts them to any 
concerns while they are considering a merger, and promptly initiates filings to regulatory 
agencies during the merger process.   To reflect these interviewee comments, we added the risk 
resolution exemplar “Proactively initiate contact with regulatory agencies (Interviewee A)” 
under 2.4 Mobilize External Stakeholders in Table 8. 
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 Neither the interviewees nor the literature provided resolutions for every risk. For 
example, Yu, Engleman and Van de Ven (2005) described several risks in an M&A integration 
resulting from the diversion of management attention, but did not proscribe a resolution to focus 
management’s attention.  In many cases the resolutions were implicit, as when Interviewee B 
described the risk of an acquirer’s failure to have an integration plan.  The resolution was 
unstated but clearly it is to have an integration plan.   
 All of the risks mentioned in the literature were mentioned unprompted by the 
interviewees. Only one risk mentioned by the interviewees, the risk of government regulation, 
did not appear in our literature review, and we have added it to the risk area External Stakeholder 
Risk.  All of the resolution areas we derived from the literature were mentioned by the 
interviewees except National Culture. Conversely, almost all of the resolutions mentioned by the 
interviewees were available in the literature.  This evaluation provides some comfort that the 
literature review resulted in determining the risks practitioners face in the post-selection phase of 
mergers and acquisitions.   
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DEVELOPING THE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
We developed a risk management framework for M&A by identifying the risks and risk 
resolutions inherent in the practice of M&A and in the literature and synthesizing the risks and 
risk resolutions into twelve risk factors under three categories. We then linked the risk factors 
and risk resolutions, using a risk-action list as developed by Boehm (Boehm, 1991).  Next we 
developed the framework for use in the risk management process. 
VII.I  Framework Design 
We developed the framework by following Boehm’s outline for the practice of risk 
management (Boehm, 1991).  Under the first category, risk assessment, one conducts the steps of 
risk identification, risk analysis and risk prioritization. The second category, risk control, 
involves the steps of risk management planning, risk resolution and risk monitoring.  Our 
framework will incorporate the first four steps, including the risk management planning process, 
where it can then be incorporated into a company’s M&A integration management plan for use 
in the ongoing M&A process. 
Boehm’s software risk management techniques are suitable for use here, as software 
projects have some similarities to the M&A process.  The software project risks mentioned by 
Boehm all have corresponding risks in the M&A arena.  The software project risks Boehm 
mentions are the frequency of software-project disasters, the possibility of avoiding those 
disasters with early identification and resolution of high-risk items, and the enthusiasm which 
carries a project forward despite the failure to attend to the high-risk items. M&A and software 
projects also share possible involvement with multiple functional areas of a company, are often 
complicated to administer, and are subject to time pressures and limitations.   Both mergers and 
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large-scale software projects are infrequent events compared to the day-to-day management 
activities of a firm.  
We used Boehm’s risk-action list, which combines at least one risk resolution action with 
each risk factor on the list.  We chose it because risk-action lists are considered easier to use and 
modify than risk-strategy models (Persson, Mathiassen, Boeg et al., 2009) and provide more 
guidance to practitioners than a risk list. Some researchers in the M&A field have followed the 
risk-action list approach with a limited scope to identify a small list of risk items and resolution 
actions.  For example, Cartwright and Cooper (1996) provided a guide to evaluate corporate 
cultures and a checklist for use in acquisitions to improve the selection of merger partners and 
aid in integration planning.   
Because the post-selection phase of M&A transactions often takes place within a very 
limited time and is usually a collaborative process with many participants, the ease of employing 
a framework is important. The need to employ a framework concurrently by M&A managers 
who may come from more than one organization and in several functional areas of an 
organization requires the framework be easy to quickly understand.  It is also important to be 
able to modify a framework to fit an M&A process as it begins, and then to be able to further 
adjust and modify it as the process develops. The risk-action list fits the criterion of ease of use 
and modification.  
There are numerous approaches to developing risk management frameworks, each with 
different methods of addressing the elements of risk, resolution and their integration into a 
framework.   Iversen, Mathiassen and Nielsen (2004) identified four approaches in the field of 
software risk management, including generic risk lists, the risk-action list we have chosen, and 
two risk-strategy models.  We chose not to use the generic risk list because it does not include 
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risk resolutions, which are an important part of the framework. Practitioners in M&A seek to 
identify and resolve risks, and the inclusion of risk resolutions in a framework aids in risk 
resolution.   
 Iversen, Mathiassen and Nielsen (2004) also identified two risk-strategy frameworks that 
provide increased strategic oversight capabilities.  However, they have limitations that may make 
them less suitable for the M&A process. The risk-strategy model summarizes numerous 
relationships based on a limited number of risk categories and resolution categories. The use of 
the risk-strategy model in the context of an M&A process may lead managers to deemphasize 
important risks which are part of a risk category that is not emphasized in the selection of a risk 
profile.  And while the risk-strategy analysis approach may retain the granularity of specific risks 
and resolutions so they can be easily addressed, the benefits of building the framework with a 
strategic level of analysis may be offset by the added complexity of building the framework.  
Following Boehm, we prepared a framework comprised of risk assessment, which 
included risk identification, risk analysis, and risk prioritization, as well as risk control, here 
comprised of risk-management planning.  We designed this framework for the M&A process as 
described below: 
i)  Risk identification is the first step of risk assessment.  During risk 
identification, the risks we have previously identified are combined with the risks 
identified by the managers for the specific M&A situation. We identified hundreds of 
individual risks to the post-selection phase of M&A. Those individual risks were 
categorized into twelve risk factors, which we grouped into three areas (Content, Context 
and Process) in accordance with Pettigrew’s format (Pettigrew, 1987).  We chose the 
level of detail provided by the twelve risk factors to allow managers using the framework 
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to discuss the relative importance of the twelve risk factors without formally evaluating 
all individual risks in the M&A transaction before them.    
ii)  The second step is risk analysis, which is an assessment of the likelihood 
of each risk factor negatively impacting the merger, and the magnitude of the impact 
should it occur. The risk analysis stage is conducted by measuring the risk exposure of 
each risk factor.  The risk exposure is measured by multiplying the probability each 
identified risk will produce an “unsatisfactory outcome” (Boehm, 1991 p. 33) times the 
loss if the event associated with the risk occurs.   For each risk factor produced in the risk 
identification stage, the framework users arrive at two numerical ratings, one for its 
probability and one for impact.  We used a scale of one to three for these ratings. 
iii)  In the risk prioritization stage, participants in an actual M&A situation 
rank order the risk factors. Users calculate a risk exposure for each risk factor by 
multiplying the likelihood rating times the probability rating for each risk factor. In 
addition to the numeric inputs provided independently by project participants, group 
discussions are held to confirm, clarify and achieve consensus on the rank ordering. This 
step should be done with a number of participants from the management team to 
stimulate discussion, provide a thorough analysis of the importance of each risk area in 
the context of a particular transaction, and improve support for the conclusions reached 
by the group. We chose to calculate risk exposure at the risk factor level.  We believe the 
twelve risk factors conceptualized in the framework provide an appropriate level of detail 
for risk management, avoiding the lack of specificity if risk areas such as context, content 
and process were used instead. Persson (2009) chose to use eight risk areas in prioritizing 
risk, to avoid the detail of using their 24 risk factors. In Harris (2007), the management 
61 
 
 
team undertaking a risk management process found twelve risk constructs appropriate for 
use in describing the riskiness of their acquisitions.   
iv) During the risk control stage, managers conduct the fourth step of risk 
management, risk management planning.  During risk management planning, users 
prepare a plan to address the risk factors. The risk exposures calculated in step three and 
the risk resolution techniques are used to prepare this plan.   Participants use risk 
resolution strategies, modified by the participant’s experience and the specific M&A 
process, to address each risk and develop a plan for addressing the high priority risks. 
The exemplar actions from the literature provide further guidance by detailing possible 
actions with which to conduct the resolution strategy.  The risk management plans 
developed for each of the risks are then integrated with each other and with other ongoing 
functions of the merging companies. An example of this integration would be when 
contact with customers occurs in the ordinary course of business for the merging 
companies.  The risk management plan may call for increased contact with customers 
concerning the merger.  These increased contacts and ordinary contacts may need to be 
coordinated to ensure customers receive a consistent message and that it is presented with 
the desired frequency and style. Finally, the risk management plan is integrated with the 
overall process guiding the implementation of the merger.   
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Table 14 is an example of a risk assessment template which could be provided to 
managers in a merger to evaluate the relative levels of risk faced in a particular situation.  
Table 14 – Risk Assessment Template 
 Risk 
Name 
Risk 
Definition 
   Risk Level 
 
Risk Impact 
 
Risk 
Expo-
sure 
   L M H L M H  
1.1 Systems 
Compatibility 
Merging firms have practices, 
systems, reward systems or 
operating policies which are so 
incompatible integration 
problems are created. 
 
 
 
 
__ 
 
 
 
 
__ 
 
 
 
 
__ 
 
 
 
 
__ 
 
 
 
 
__ 
 
 
 
 
__ 
 
 
 
 
_____ 
1.2 Integration Bias Integration decisions are 
dominated by one party or by 
limited business, technical or 
functional areas. 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
_____ 
1.3 Organizational 
Culture 
Merger process or integration 
is hampered or resisted due to 
differences in corporate 
cultures. 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
_____ 
1.4 National 
Culture 
Merger process or integration 
is negatively impacted by 
differences in nationalities, 
language or culture. 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
_____ 
2.1 Customer 
Relationships 
Customer relationships are 
negatively impacted by the 
merger. 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
_____ 
2.2 Contextual 
Ignorance 
Contexts outside the company 
are not adequately understood 
or are insufficiently attended to 
during the merger process. 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
_____ 
2.3 Adverse 
 Behavior 
Employee behavior due to the 
merger process negatively 
impacts company performance 
during and after the merger 
process. 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
_____ 
2.4 External 
Stakeholder 
Outside stakeholders do not 
support, understand or 
collaborate with the process. 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
_____ 
3.1 Process Inadequate management action        
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Management or leadership of the merger 
process leads to a significant 
departure from merger goals. 
 
 
___ 
 
 
___ 
 
 
___ 
 
 
___ 
 
 
___ 
 
 
___ 
 
 
_____ 
3.2 Integration 
Timing 
Timeliness of the planning for 
and implementation of the 
integration is inadequate. 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
_____ 
3.3 Resources 
Shortfall 
There is insufficient slack, 
resources or skills to properly 
prosecute the integration 
program or realize expected 
benefits of the merger 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
_____ 
3.4 Political 
Escalation 
Political struggles over which 
company’s management 
systems to use 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
_____ 
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Figure 1 below outlines the framework. 
Figure 1 – Risk Management Framework 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identify Risks 
M&A Team Members 
use framework risk list 
and add risks applicable 
for that project. 
Analyze Risks 
Evaluate probability and 
impact of each risk area 
for this acquisition 
 
Prioritize Risk 
Rank order risks based 
on analysis of risks. 
 
Risk Management 
Planning 
Develop plan to address 
risks for incorporation in 
risk management plan 
and/or M&A planning. 
 65 
 
EVALUATING FRAMEWORK 
 
We then utilized published case studies to evaluate the framework for its risk 
identification and risk management planning potential. We evaluated the thoroughness and 
potential usefulness of the framework by comparing the four cases to the framework. While we 
did not have the benefit of interviewing the managers involved in the cases, we conducted an 
examination of the cases to evaluate a hypothetical use of the framework. 
VIII.I  Risk Identification  
We found that in the cases  the risks identifiable from the cases had been identified in the 
literature.  We did find some of the risk areas identified from the literature were not identifiable 
in the cases. Table 15 below tabulates the risks and risk resolutions found in the four cases.  
Appendix C provides details concerning the risks and risk resolutions identified in each case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
 
 
Table 15 – Tabulation of Case Mentions of Risk and Risk Resolutions 
 
Each risk and risk resolution we identified in a case is marked with a checkmark. 
Risk Area  Bombardier Deloitte Dow Unity 
1.1 Systems Compatibility Risks     
  RR     
1.2 Integration Bias Risks     
  RR     
1.3 Organizational Culture  Risks     
  RR     
1.4 National Culture 
 Bias 
Risks     
  RR     
2.1 Customer Relationship Risks     
  RR     
2.2 Contextual  Ignorance Risks     
  RR     
2.3 Adverse Behavior Risks     
  RR     
2.4 External Stakeholder Risks     
  RR     
3.1 Process Management Risks     
  RR     
3.2 Integration Timing Risks     
  RR     
3.3 Resources  Shortfall Risks     
  RR     
3.4 Political Escalation Risks     
  RR     
 
The process management risk area arises from inadequate management action or 
leadership of the merger process. This concern was present in all four cases.  For example, in the 
Dow case the managers identified process management risks from the IT integration process, 
entering a new product line and ad hoc management of the acquisition process. 
External stakeholder risks were identified only in the Bombardier case. External 
stakeholder risk is defined as a situation where outside stakeholders do not support or understand 
the merger process. The risks presented by the need for Bombardier to obtain European 
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Commission (EC) approval of the transaction were highlighted. The risks were: 1) the EC would 
not approve the transaction, since management perceived the EC was biased against a U.S. 
company buying a European business, and 2) the limited access Bombardier was allowed to 
Adtranz prior to approval, which impeded efforts to plan the integration. 
The risks posed by national culture were not identified as such in any of the cases, 
despite three of the four acquisitions involving companies with headquarters or substantial 
operations in two different countries.  This may be because, in the case of the cross-border 
acquisitions, the acquirer and acquiree both operated in numerous countries before the 
acquisition, and sometimes both companies had operations in the country or continent where the 
acquiree was located. For example, in the Unity case, South Africa-based Unity had operations 
in the United States prior to its proposed acquisition of Delta, which operated only in the United 
States. Managers at Unity framed their employee-related integration issues in terms of process or 
context issues, less often as content issues, and not national culture issues. For example, one 
employee-related integration issue for Unity concerned how to evaluate good IT professionals 
and dismiss others from the combined operations in the rushed environment dictated by the 
merger process. This was framed as a process management risk, not a cultural risk. Similarly, 
when confronted with the decision as to which side to pick to run the new organization, and their 
concerns about the possible employee gamesmanship which might result from those decisions, 
management did not point to cultural differences as an issue.  Instead, the risk was framed in 
terms of context risks, primarily adverse behavior. Management’s concerns were with possible 
negative reactions inherent in the context of the merger as certain groups or people were chosen 
over others, but these were not framed as national or organizational culture clashes. 
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Risks of political escalation were only mentioned in the Unity case, where it was 
characterized as benign compared to most of the exemplars from the literature.  For example, we 
found the term “sabotaged by cliques” in the literature as an exemplar of political escalation, but 
in the Unity case, the political escalation took the form of the Delta staff approaching the 
integration manager to seek retention of two systems which provided productivity tools for 
business users.  So the description of political escalation provided to management users of the 
framework should emphasize the range of situations encompassed by this risk area, not only the 
extreme cases.  
VIII.II  Risk Management Planning 
 In risk management planning, management develops a plan to address the risks they have 
previously analyzed and prioritized. The framework provides resolution strategies for each risk 
area as well as exemplary actions from the literature which help explain the strategies. We 
evaluated the risk management guidance provided by the framework in a similar manner as 
Alaranta and Mathiassen (2011) by comparing the strategies employed by the managers in case 
studies with those in the framework.  We found that most of the resolution strategies in the 
framework were considered for use by managers in the cases.  We did not find any strategies 
suggested in the cases which were not available in the framework. 
 We evaluated the potential effectiveness of the risk resolution strategies in the framework 
by  reviewing the cases to determine if the proposed risk resolution strategies were applicable. 
VIII.II.i Content risks. 
1.1 For systems compatibility issues, the resolution strategy is to analyze and design 
systems early.  Systems compatibility issues in the Bombardier case were discovered early in the 
M&A process by the senior management team at Bombardier.  They recognized that these issues 
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required them to proceed immediately with planning for the merged systems, including 
evaluating what degree of integration was desired. 
1.2 Integration bias issues arose in all four cases, as did risk resolution strategies for 
them. In the Dow case the framework’s suggested resolution strategy of adopting a systematic 
evaluation process was used to counter two identified integration bias risks. The first risk was 
that Dow would “overpower” the acquiree Wolff and lose a “diamond in the rough.”  The second 
risk was that an emphasis on the speed of integration at Dow would overwhelm other 
considerations. Dow management discussed several of the exemplar actions listed in the 
framework to counter these risks, including adjusting the integration process on a case-by-case 
basis, evaluating the “treasured assets” of the target, and being aware of the mindset of the target.  
For example, Dow considered delaying the realization of annual cost savings which would come 
from integration of Dow’s global IT systems into Wolff to avoid disturbing Wolff’s “leading 
edge automated manufacturing process.” 
After adopting a systematic evaluation process, Deloitte attempted to resolve integration 
bias risks using several exemplar actions. They considered implications of both companies’ 
technologies by involving key people from both Deloitte and Andersen on the integration teams 
and encouraging the identification and implementation of best practices regardless of their 
source. 
1.3 The resolution strategy for organizational culture issues is to plan and motivate 
collaboration. This strategy was utilized in the Deloitte case, by combining people from both 
organizations at on offsite location, having the integration team pay particular attention to the 
organizational culture differences, and relying on victories in the marketplace to bring the two 
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groups together.  These specific actions are all suggested in the exemplar actions for dealing with 
organizational culture issues. 
1.4 National culture risks were not identified in the cases. 
VIII.II.ii  Context risks. 
2.1 Customer relationship risks 
Customer relationship risks call for managers to implement strategies to maintain 
marketing momentum, including retaining key employees with customer relationships, involving 
customers in the process, and quickly integrating market-related aspects of the merger.  In the 
Unity case, customer relationships presented several risks due to the critical and time-sensitive 
role Delta’s services played in their customer’s operations.  The risk resolution in the framework 
calls for management to implement strategies to maintain marketing momentum.  Unity did that 
by considering taking advantage of Delta’s superior knowledge of its own systems by allowing 
Delta to lead the integration. Unity also weighed delaying the integration until after an important, 
previously scheduled task for a large Delta client had been finished. 
2.2 Contextual ignorance risk 
Contextual ignorance, which occurs when contexts outside the company are not well 
understood or are insufficiently attended to during integration, may be remedied by engaging 
and informing key stakeholders.  In the Dow case, contextual ignorance took the form of an 
initial lack of understanding of the potential impact of German holiday schedules on the best 
timing for the integration. It was also represented by Dow’s initial failure to realize that Wolff 
had a stand-alone business services unit which provided service to other companies, but which 
did not fit in Dow’s business model.  Dow engaged and informed by considering adjusting the 
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integration schedule until after the scheduled German vacations, and considering numerous 
alternatives to quickly shutting down the business services unit. 
2.3 Adverse behavior risk 
Adverse behavior risk, the risk of employee behavior negatively impacting company 
performance, calls for managers to aggressively manage employee relations. This was a concern 
in all four cases, and management considered resolution strategies in all cases.  Unity considered 
countering gamesmanship, resistance to change and potentially demoralized staff by leaving 
some of Delta’s systems intact, creating integration departments from both companies, and 
announcing which systems will be terminated promptly.  Deloitte sought to fight “rumors that 
fed anxiety among people in both organizations” by finding common ground and encouraging 
employees to become invested in the process.  
2.4 External stakeholder risk 
External stakeholder risk, the risk that outside stakeholders do not support, understand or 
collaborate with the process, was identified only in the Bombardier case.  Bombardier negotiated 
with the outside stakeholder, the EC, by proactively working with them and resolving issues as 
quickly as possible. 
VIII.II.iii Process risks. 
3.1 Process management risk 
Process management risks and risk resolutions were identified in all four cases.  The risk 
resolution strategy for this risk is to continuously plan and reorganize process. Deloitte did this 
by “monitoring the integration process through a monthly survey” which allowed them to “take 
remedial action if… the integration goals were not obtained.”  This survey was also used as the 
basis for a monthly conference call to “share updates and ideas.”  Thus Deloitte utilized 
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exemplar actions identified in the literature by having a dedicated merger integration team and 
developing a systematic integration process.  
In the Dow case, Dow had developed a very detailed integration methodology for its 
many acquisitions, and implemented this methodology via a planning center they called the 
Program Management Office. Through this office, Dow used exemplar actions such as preparing 
a “merger intent” document and having a dedicated integration team with selective participation. 
3.2 Integration Timing 
The framework suggests that managers seeking to resolve integration timing risks should 
monitor and adapt timing. Unity faced a large processing task for an important Delta client. This 
led Unity to consider speeding up systems conversion before the event or postpone it, in line 
with exemplar actions which suggest “integrate at proper speed” and “carefully evaluate … 
ability to manage pace of change.”  Unity’s concern over the risk of possible disruption to the 
companies if the integration of the infrastructure was done too soon led them choose to sacrifice 
some potential cost savings to avoid the disruption, another example of monitoring and adapting 
their timing. 
3.3 Resources shortfall 
Some mergers are at risk of a resources shortfall, when there are insufficient resources or 
skills to properly manage the integration process. Deloitte was concerned that taking people 
offsite during the integration process would impact billable hours. Their solution, which was in 
line with the framework’s resolution strategy to ensure and monitor appropriate resources, was 
to form a national integration team to lead the integration and reduce the required involvement of 
other company personnel. 
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3.4 Political escalation 
Political struggles over which company’s management systems to use, or political 
escalation, was a concern in the Unity case.  Unity’s proposed solution was to implement 
processes for conflict resolution by creating integration departments with resources from both 
companies to determine which systems should continue in use.  Thus Unity could have looked to 
the framework’s exemplar actions for guidance, including having resolution mechanisms in place 
and managing conflict constructively from very beginning.   
VIII.III  Conclusion 
 By applying the framework in selected case studies, we were able to better understand the 
risk identification potential and risk management applicability of the framework in the M&A 
process. We found that the overlap of the cases with the framework was substantial, as indicated 
in detail in Table 15 and in summary in Table 16 below.  As a further check on the possible 
applicability of the framework, we applied the risk prioritization step to the Unity Case. 
Appendix E shows the results of that exercise. We found that even without the advantages of a 
dialogue with managers undergoing a merger, the case study was able to provide clues which 
allowed us to estimate the severity and likelihood of various risk areas as they might appear to a 
management team.  Subject to its use by practitioners involved in or reflecting on an actual 
M&A process, we believe applying the case studies indicates that the framework can be a useful 
risk management tool for practitioners. 
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Table 16 Overlap of Cases and Framework 
 Found in cases, available in 
framework 
Available in framework, found 
in cases 
Risk Identification All All except National Culture 
Risk Management Planning All All except National Culture 
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DISCUSSION 
 
After decades of practice and research, the value of corporate mergers and acquisitions to 
the acquiring company is still very much in doubt. The management of the risks inherent in the 
merger process may account for some of the problems in M&A performance. Methods of 
counteracting or mitigating some of the problems or risks in the merger process are presented in 
the literature.  These include lists with recommended steps to effect a successful merger and 
detailed due diligence checklists developed by practitioners and researchers (Hubbard, 2001; 
Rosenbloom, 2002).  Our research builds on previous research by listing and classifying the risks 
and risk resolutions in the post-selection stage of M&A, and linking the risks and risk resolution 
techniques in a risk management framework. 
The extensive literature investigating the problems presented by mergers does not supply 
a comprehensive list of risks and risk resolutions, nor does it provide a framework for managing 
risks in the post-selection phase of M&A transactions.  Our research provides a list of risks and 
risk resolutions derived from the literature, synthesized for easier use and understanding and 
refined by interviews with practitioners.  We evaluated the resulting framework using previously 
published case studies. Our research follows in the path of research into the risk management 
process (Boehm, 1991), risk management within the MIS function of the M&A environment 
(Alaranta and Mathiassen, 2011),  assisting managers in assessing the risk profile of an 
acquisition (Harris, 2007), and recognizing the importance of the integration process for the 
success of M&As (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986;  Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). 
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IX.I  Practitioners 
Haleblian, Devers, McNamara et al. (2009) noted that scholarly insights in M&A did not 
seem to be helping practitioners improve their M&A results. They ask if these insights are not 
being transferred to practitioners, or if they are “impractical or unfeasible to execute” (p. 485).  
The risk management framework provided by this research is designed to be usable by 
practitioners in the hope it can facilitate the transfer of knowledge to practitioners. 
Based in part on our experience in M&A practice, we reviewed the literature and have 
distilled the prior knowledge into a new form which is more accessible to other practitioners.  
Our work can serve as the basis for further use, analysis and refinement by practitioners and 
scholars.  For example, our research could be used by practitioners by using a web-based 
software interface.  The risk and risk resolution factors we have synthesized could be presented 
to managers using the interface. When a manager identified a risk area of interest, the research 
from which that risk was derived could be presented for further analysis and application. This 
software interface could enable our research to increase access to the detail in the literature at the 
time it is most needed, and may increase the transfer of knowledge.   This software interface 
could also be used to facilitate collaboration among managers undergoing an M&A process. 
This research can also serve as the basis for practitioner-oriented articles which distill the 
research into a more accessible, usable form for practitioners. Included in these articles could be 
the form for evaluating risk factors from Table 14 for application by practitioners. 
A risk assessment for a particular merger could be conducted by interviewing managers 
while they are involved in the merger.  Managers could be asked to confirm that the risk-action 
lists are viable and list the risks they encounter, and to evaluate the risk probability and impact 
for each factor.  From their evaluations, the framework can be changed to improve ease of use 
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and the practicality of the risk-action list for a particular acquisition or industry.  This type of 
approach was used by Persson, Mathiassen, Boeg et al. (2009) to develop a risk management 
framework for use in distributed software projects.  
Our risk management framework may be useful in guiding practitioners in the 
management of M&A transactions. It may prove useful for management teams to explicate the 
risks perceived by various managers within a company to encourage agreement or understanding 
of the risks presented by a pending merger.   
Researchers working with practitioners could utilize the framework to evaluate its 
usefulness in relation to current company practices in an active M&A process or retrospectively 
to review a company’s M&A experience.  Mohrman, Gibson and Mohrman (2001) found that 
practitioners viewed research as more useful when it was applied collaboratively with 
researchers to address company problems. A joint interpretation of results with practitioners may 
increase the knowledge transfer of this research to practice.   
Serial acquirers may  increase their likelihood for successful merger outcomes based on 
the learning and expertise they acquire (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). It is possible that part 
of that increased success rate is due to identifying and mitigating the risk factors inherent in 
acquisitions. This research produced a framework which may assist managers in helping them 
document and apply that learning for their organizations for future acquisitions.  Although we 
believe that the framework would be of assistance to managers, we have not been able to validate 
that it would enable them to achieve different M&A outcomes. 
Practitioners may benefit by the implementation of risk lists proposed in our framework. The 
benefits of implementing checklists for software practitioners are discussed in Keil, Li, 
Mathiassen, and Zheng (2008), who found that the use of checklists helped the practitioners 
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identify more risks than when no checklist was used.  They also found that managers changed 
their behavior when certain types of risk were identified, but that the total number of risks 
identified did not influence behavior. Our framework could be used to identify the key risks 
which influence the behavior of managers during the M&A process, and provoke further 
investigation into those particular risks. 
IX.II  Contributions/Future Research 
 The importance of the risk factors and viability of the risk resolutions identified here, and 
their impact on M&A transactions, could be explored using similar methods as in Wallace and 
Keil (2004).  As was done by Wallace and Keil with software project managers,  M&A managers 
from numerous companies could be surveyed to indicate which risks were present in recent 
transactions they managed. They could then evaluate the success of the M&A process, including 
its completion versus the schedule, achieving other short and long term goals, and their success 
in managing the risks.  We might then be able to better understand which risks impact merger 
success, how well the resolutions are utilized, and evaluate the success of the application of those 
risk resolutions. 
 Management behavior when a risk management framework is included in the M&A 
process could be compared to behavior without the use of these risk management techniques. 
These behaviors could include both the identification of risks, their use of risk resolution 
techniques, and their ex post evaluation of the efficacy of their actions. 
 The risk management framework may serve as a basis for further research seeking to 
explain M&A process issues and M&A outcomes.  For example, researchers could review 
completed acquisitions to determine the degree to which the risk management framework was 
implemented, and evaluate the effect on M&A outcomes from using the framework. 
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Researchers could compare M&A performance to the riskiness of the process. The risk of 
the process could be determined using the framework to measure managers’ level of perceived 
risk in their particular M&A transactions. This risk could be compared to the performance of the 
mergers using the traditional measures of performance such as CARs, operating performance or 
management evaluation. 
 Researchers might also be used to determine which risk factors most threaten M&A 
performance. Management’s use of risk resolution techniques or other responses to the perceived 
risk could also be evaluated to determine if risk factors are best resolved using particular risk 
resolution techniques.  For example, when organizational culture differences are perceived to be 
an important risk, which of the resolutions suggested by the literature lead to effective 
resolution?  Under what circumstances does one work and not the other?  
Some of the lessons learned in the M&A arena may prove helpful in evaluating risks in 
strategic alliances, joint ventures and other situations, such as some private-equity backed 
acquisitions.  However, the focus of this dissertation is on M&As which involve a change of 
ownership control and which require some degree of integration of the two operating entities. 
For additional evaluation of the framework, several interviews could be conducted with 
members of the same merger team within an organization, as was done by Harris (2007). Even 
more preferable would be the use of the framework during the course of an actual project, as was 
done by Iversen (2004). 
The framework may benefit from use and iterations with practitioners while they are in 
the process of managing the M&A process. It may prove beneficial to alter the framework to suit 
the M&A practices and issues of specific industries.   
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Although our search of peer-reviewed articles was extensive, there may be additional 
relevant research, either in the non-academic literature, or references published prior to 1992, 
which would contribute to our understanding of the risks and risk resolutions in M&A. 
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Appendix B:  Detailed Comments from Cases 
1. Unity Case 
Risk# Risk Faced Description of Problem Resolution 
Strategy 
Per 
Framework 
Description of  
Resolution Strategy 
Considered or 
Utilized in Case 
1.1 Systems 
Compatibility 
Integration problems would be 
created by adding a consolidation 
of the Unity and Delta systems. 
Unity’s systems already had 
substantial weaknesses, and Delta 
had not consolidated its own 
systems, presumably because of the 
cost, difficulty and potential impact 
on customers such a consolidation 
would have entailed 
  
1.2 Integration 
Bias 
New organizational structure 
needed for combined companies. 
Some felt Unity staff should take 
over since they were the acquirer 
Adopt 
systematic 
evaluation 
process 
Considered creating 
integration 
departments drawing 
upon resources from 
both companies. 
2.1 Customer 
Relationships 
Unity did not want customers to 
leave Delta because of its new 
management 
  
2.1 Customer 
Relationships 
Large processing task for one of 
Delta’s biggest clients scheduled to 
occur in three months 
  
2.1 Customer 
Relationship 
A specific requirement for a client 
was not well documented, if not 
delivered client might be lost 
Implement 
strategies to 
maintain 
marketing 
momentum 
Allow Delta to lead 
the integration since 
Delta knows their 
systems best. 
2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
Delta staff members already 
resisting change due to Delta 
systems possibly being retired 
Aggressively 
manage e/e 
relations 
Back down from 
terminating some 
Delta systems? 
2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
Gamesmanship if picked either side 
to run the new organizational 
structure 
Aggressively 
manage 
employee 
relations 
Considered creating 
integration 
departments drawing 
upon resources from 
both companies. 
2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
Some staff members will be 
demoralized by the increased 
uncertainty brought about by 
change 
Aggressively 
manage 
employee 
relations 
Be candid and 
announce which 
systems will be 
terminated, or delay 
announcement until 
last possible moment 
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3.1 Process 
Management 
Largest acquisition Unity had done.  Dedicated Integration 
team appointed at 
Unity with 
experienced members 
from offices around 
the world 
3.1 Process 
Management 
Evaluating good IT pros and letting 
others go difficult in rushed 
environment dictated by merger 
process 
Continuously 
plan and 
reorganize 
process 
None proposed 
3.2 Integration 
Timing 
Work can’t begin due to legal  and 
regulatory hurdles 
  
3.2  Integration 
Timing 
Large processing task for one of 
Delta’s biggest clients scheduled to 
occur in three months 
 Speed up conversion 
before event? 
3.2 Integration 
Timing 
Disruption if infrastructure (phones, 
networking hardware) done too 
soon 
Monitor and 
adapt timing 
Run two systems for a 
while to avoid 
disrupting clients vs. 
cost savings expected 
from consolidating 
soon. 
3.3 Resources 
Shortfall 
Large acquisition would be most 
demanding that Unity had done 
 Create effective plan 
to cover all 
requirements. 
Specifically, 
integration plan must 
considers and 
prioritizes four critical 
factors software, 
infrastructure, 
organizational 
structure and people. 
3.4 Political 
Escalation 
Political struggles over which 
company’s management systems to 
use 
Implement 
processes for 
conflict 
resolution 
Considered creating 
integration 
departments drawing 
upon resources from 
both companies. 
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2. Dow Case 
Risk# Risk Faced Description of Problem Resolution 
Strategy 
Per 
Framework 
Description of  
Resolution Strategy 
Considered or 
Utilized in Case 
1.2 Integration 
Bias 
If we overpower acquiree 
[Wolff] we may discard a 
diamond in the rough 
Adopt 
systematic 
evaluation 
process 
Recognized that Dow could 
learn from Wolff’s high level 
of automation and transfer this 
to other business units. 
 
1.2 
Integration 
Bias 
To some people at Dow, 
speed of integration meant 
everything. 
Adopt 
systematic 
evaluation 
process 
Adjust integration process on 
a case-by-case basis 
 
2.1 
Customer 
Relationships 
Dow entering specialty 
chemicals business with 
new types of customers 
Implement 
strategies to 
maintain 
marketing 
momentum 
Consider what strategy (fast 
or slower integration) would 
be most effective. Integrate 
customer-facing activities at a 
slower pace or not integrate 
them at all 
2.2 Contextual 
Ignorance 
Germans consider their 
summer holiday sacrosanct, 
this might delay integration 
timing. 
 Proposed launching none of 
the integration projects until 
October. 
2.2 Contextual 
Ignorance 
Wolff had a business 
services unit which 
provided services to outside 
companies, as well as to 
Wolff, using a business 
model which was foreign to 
Dow. Dow did not know 
about this unit before 
making the purchase. 
Engage and 
inform key 
stakeholders. 
Dow needed to find a 
completely new IT system for 
this unit, which would cost $2 
million. 
2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
Gaps between each other’s 
way of working.  Wolff’s 
staff working against 
instead of with acquirer 
staff. 
 Created a “chill period” 
during which companies bring 
issues to the table, jointly 
work on them and make sure 
you don’t miss any. Through 
intensive interaction, got the 
Wolff staff to cooperate. 
3.1 Process 
Management 
IT integration process 
concerns 
Continuously 
plan and 
reorganize 
process 
Integration speed is key, and 
is better achieved through 
implementation steering 
committee, joint planning 
sessions with both sides, 
setting key milestones, have 
Day One checklist and devise 
performance metrics 
 
3.1 
Process 
Management 
Management of the 
acquisition process was ad 
Continuously 
plan and 
Developed a standard 
methodology for managing 
92 
 
 
hoc reorganize 
process 
the due diligence and 
implementation stages 
3.1 Process 
Management 
Entering new product line 
so risk in integration 
approach chosen 
Continuously 
plan and 
reorganize 
process 
Determine how fast and fully 
to integrate passed on 
strategic rationale for the 
merger.  Provided time for 
input from all acquirer 
functional and business 
leaders before integration 
planning complete 
 
3.2 
Integration 
Timing 
Three month extension of 
the integration requested. 
Dow upper management 
resisted effort to delay 
integration due to delay in 
realizing cost synergies. 
Integrate at 
proper speed 
Delay integration to allow 
time due to summer vacation 
and concerns about 
implementing without 
adequate planning. 
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3. Bombardier Case 
Risk# Risk Faced Description of Problem Resolution 
Strategy 
Per 
Framework 
Description of  
Resolution Strategy 
Considered or 
Utilized in Case 
     
1.1 Systems 
Compatibility 
Certain management practices 
need adjustment. 
Analyze and 
design systems 
early 
Integration planning 
begun while still awaiting 
regulatory approval 
1.1 Systems 
Compatibility 
Fundamentally incompatible 
organizational structures must 
be reconciled. 
 Integration planning 
begun while still awaiting 
regulatory approval 
1.2 Integration 
Bias 
How quickly to integrate and 
what existing approaches to 
replace? 
Adopt 
systematic 
evaluation 
process 
BBD tried to eliminate 
waste ... by applying … 
management approaches 
over time as opposed to 
pushing to replace 
existing methods.   
Transfers were not all one 
way, aerospace also 
shared its best practices 
with engineering. 
1.3 Organizational 
Culture 
“I don’t think Adtranz has had 
enough time to develop its own 
culture. Every two years there 
seems to have been a change of 
ownership, a change in 
structure, a change in values, 
and a change in processes. So 
under the circumstances you 
don’t get a good sense of who 
you are.” 
  
1.3 Organizational 
Culture 
Need to get management 
focused on the 
operations…avoid finger 
pointing at former Adtranz 
management and create a 
climate conductive to teamwork. 
  
2.1 Customer 
Relationships 
Should we focus our planning 
on ways to improve the product 
quality and reliability of 
Adtranz equipment with 
existing customers? 
Implement 
strategies to 
maintain 
marketing 
momentum 
 
2.1 Customer 
Relationships 
Cost cutting could hurt market 
performance of company. 
 Ensure  a balance 
between cost reduction … 
and revenue growth. 
2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
The management team would be 
demoralized if Bombardier was 
invited in only to later walk 
 Negotiated a delayed 
payment to be made after 
Bombardier had a chance 
94 
 
 
away from the transaction. to do more due diligence. 
2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
How to transform businesses 
into market leaders? 
Adopt 
systematic 
evaluation 
process 
… good relationships 
with existing personnel 
and development of pride 
within those on the team. 
2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
Need to streamline costs 
difficult to do quickly in a large 
acquisition. 
 Focus first on creating a 
healthy operating 
environment. 
2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
Need to minimize tensions and 
maximize teamwork with 
personnel changes imminently 
on the horizon? 
  
2.4 External 
Stakeholder 
EC approval process limits pre-
closing due diligence and 
interaction between firms. 
 
Mobilize 
external 
shareholders 
Negotiation strategy with 
EC to id critical issues in 
advance and minimize 
disagreements. 
2.4 External 
Stakeholder 
EC might have a bias against 
North American companies. 
 Tried to shape focus of 
EC on European market 
in total, make concessions 
to EC. 
3.1 Process 
Management 
Do we sit and wait for approval 
from the EC before taking steps 
toward integration? 
Continuously 
plan and 
reorganize 
process 
 
3.1 Process 
Management 
Have to make sure people are 
focusing on key factors and 
what needs to get done. 
Continuously 
plan and 
reorganize 
process 
You should never forget 
that people like successes 
and being on the winning 
team. 
3.2 Integration 
Timing 
BBD had a reputation for being 
patient in the integration of the 
acquired company. 
Integrate at 
proper speed 
 
3.2 Integration 
Timing 
Should we start to institute 
personnel changes within BT in 
anticipation of the merger, and 
if so at what pace? 
Integrate at 
proper speed 
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4. Deloitte Case 
Risk# Risk Faced Description of Problem Resolution 
Strategy 
Per 
Framework 
Description of  
Resolution Strategy 
Considered or 
Utilized in Case 
1.2 Integration 
Bias 
“There was an attitude 
among some employees 
within Deloitte … that 
people coming from 
Andersen were damaged 
goods and that these people 
should be grateful that they 
had found a good home.” 
“…the Andersen people 
would be blamed if the 
combined organization 
missed the financial 
targets…. Such scapegoating 
would detract from the 
integration efforts.” 
Adopt 
systematic 
evaluation 
process. 
“Equal numbers of Deloitte 
and Andersen personnel 
were represented on the 
team. An effort was made to 
ensure that key people from 
both sides were involved, in 
order to guide the 
integration challenge.” 
“Best practices were 
identified, and integrating 
officers were encouraged to 
implement these practices 
across offices.” 
1.3 Organizational 
Culture 
“The cultural issues were 
showing up in day to day 
behavior.” 
“Cultures do not change that 
quickly.” 
“We don’t want to lose 
people because of poor 
interpersonal treatment.” 
“People were constantly on-
site at the client’s business.” 
 
 “The actual successes 
achieved in the marketplace 
would hold the combined 
entities together.” 
The national integration 
team paid special attention 
to cultural gaps between 
members of the two 
organizations. 
“… taking the people from 
the two organizations to an 
offsite location to deal with 
the issues of cultural 
differences…” 
 
2.1 Customer 
Relationships 
“… our goal is to make this 
transition absolutely 
seamless for our clients…” 
“Of course, we want to be 
able to retain all our clients.” 
Implement 
strategies to 
maintain 
marketing 
momentum 
 
2.2 Contextual 
Ignorance 
“Strict limitations on contact 
between Deloitte and 
Andersen to permit 
regulatory review.” 
Engage and 
inform key 
stakeholders. 
 
2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
“Numerous rumors that feed 
anxiety among people in 
both organizations…” 
“The Andersen people 
probably have a fear that 
Aggressively 
manage 
employee 
relations. 
“… we have to find 
common ground.” 
“…individuals would see (or 
feel in their pocket) that 
investing significant 
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they will be taken over and 
their identity and sense of 
value will be lost.” 
resources in the 
transaction… was worth it.” 
3.1 Process 
Management 
“There is often a strong 
tendency on the part of those 
leading the change efforts to 
declare victory too soon.” 
Continuously 
plan and 
reorganize 
process 
“Deloitte monitored the 
integration process through 
a monthly survey which 
would allow the team to 
benchmark unit to unit over 
time, and to take remedial 
action if, at specific stages, 
the integration goals were 
not attained.” 
“Once every two weeks, the 
managing partners of each 
of the five Deloitte offices 
would convene for a 
conference call to share 
updates and ideas, some of 
which resulted from the … 
survey.” 
3.2 Integration 
Timing 
Some Deloitte employees 
feared that Deloitte 
management in its haste to 
consummate this new deal 
and welcome Andersen, was 
forgetting about its own 
employees. 
Integrate at 
proper speed 
 
3.2 Integration 
Timing 
“… a lengthy process 
increased the risk that a 
major client and a significant 
number of talented 
professionals would be lost.” 
Integrate at 
proper speed 
“Because both sides moved 
rapidly, the entire process 
was completed in six 
weeks.” 
3.3 Resources 
Shortfall 
Taking people offsite to deal 
with interpersonal issues 
would affect billable hours. 
Ensure and 
monitor 
appropriate 
resources 
“A national integrations 
team consisting of 12 
individuals was formed to 
lead the integration.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
 
Appendix C:  Detailed Comments from Interviewees 
 Risks Resolutions 
1.1 System 
Compatibility 
A: If we do a larger acquisition our 
main challenge is the IT department. 
That is one of the risks if we were to 
do too many [acquisitions] too 
quickly. 
A: The challenge is …the company 
we acquire…may take two months to 
close their books as opposed to 5 or 
15 days. 
D: Have functional areas talking [early]. 
A: IT will be putting in the network so they 
can share info with us immediately [after the 
merger]. 
 
1.2 Integration 
Bias 
A: concerned about their system 
going down, not working. 
C: So they closed the transaction in 
February, [CEO] was let go in April, 
[CFO] let go in May.  Throughout 
that time, I don’t believe that 
anybody from acquirer came to our 
[acquiree] office. 
. 
D: Rank them [management] into A & B 
players, evaluate them over time, spend time 
to identify weaknesses. It’s situational, but be 
overly communicative about what you intend 
to do. 
D: Be fair to those who are departing and help 
with the outsourcing. 
D: … if you’ve got to pick a side, pick a side. 
A: Our biggest savings is in HR, getting them 
on the same health care…property 
casualty,..payroll…401k. 
A: Within a month we will have them on our 
mainframe, our network, so they will be 
billing out of our system. 
A: We then let them [acquiree management] 
manage their people to build their budgets, try 
to achieve what we feel they are capable of 
achieving. 
A: In acquisitions we do not use outside 
consulting because… we feel we have a very 
good understanding of what the business is 
worth. 
E: You have to have buyin from both sides. 
1.3 
Organizational 
Culture 
 
D: Can we get the rank and file to 
concentrate on the positives and not 
the negatives? 
C: No communication, no human 
compassion [from acquirer as it fired 
employees]. 
C: The big risk that I have seen, 
…it’s the people, the culture, and 
how do they fit. 
B: Boards bring in [managers] from a 
company with a culture of 
infrastructure.  They know how to 
work within the system, but not how 
to create it. 
 
D: Planning and participation. 
D: Spending the time to understand 
[organizational cultures] made us much more 
enthusiastic about that transaction. 
D: Merger committee has got to have both 
sides on it. 
D: Sometimes only one culture will work. If 
that is the case, communicate it. If you’ve got 
to pick a side, pick a side. 
B: It is impossible to overcommunicate. 
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1.4 National 
Culture 
D: They didn’t do a good job of 
connecting with the [other country’s] 
management. 
D: There was not an effort to make 
the connection between the future 
business owners. It caused suspicion 
and mistrust. 
 
2.1 Customer 
Relationships 
D: Don’t lose the top five customers. 
C: We were very careful about how 
we handled customer relationships. 
E: People [customers] want to make 
sure nothing is going to change. 
D: It’s pretty easy to send out a letter to every 
single customer saying, here is the situation. 
D: Hopefully put a positive spin on it, if there 
is one. 
A: We give them (customers) letters to let 
them know there is an acquisition.  They 
legally have the right to…opt out, and at that 
point in time we would have to decide if we 
wanted to go through with the acquisition, if 
they are large enough to affect the acquisition. 
C: We were very focused on getting out to the 
big customers after we announced a deal, very 
quickly. We’d go to see the CEO [of 
customers] personally, just in an effort to say 
everything’s fine. That helped a great deal. 
E: Explain [to customers] that nothing is 
going to change, but on the upside there are 
more resources available to you. 
2.2 Contextual 
Ignorance 
A: What we pay most attention to is 
to make sure that the [suppliers] 
can’t move. 
C: The first real risk was 
negotiating… patents. [Three large 
competitors] held all the patents. 
E: That [supplier relationships] can 
sometimes be a sticking issue 
 
A: We have an attorney to deal with the 
regulations of that state. 
A: We are conservative and don’t force the 
issue, if something [an acquisition] is not 
going to work you don’t do it. 
(1993) 
2.3 Adverse 
Behavior 
D: People wonder what’s up what is 
my role going forward? 
D: Do they [acquirer] share my 
vision or are they going to take me 
out?  It caused suspicion and 
mistrust. 
D: The biggest risk is losing your 
best performers. You are going to be 
left with the guys nobody wanted. 
A: …they [acquired employees] are 
always scared of what you are going 
to bring them. 
C: I got an email … that a female 
staffer [at acquired company] was 
D: Employee communications 
D: Don’t mess with people’s benefits. 
D: Position the message ..in a way that 
achieves your corporate objectives. 
D: Talk about benefits, talk about 401k. 
D: Communicate a clear compensation 
program going forward for those who are 
staying. 
D: You can always have direct conversations 
with those who are your best performers and 
bring them to be inside of a team and tell 
them you’ve been identified to stay. 
A: The key is just getting the seller’s 
management to buy off on your program 
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being sexually harassed. 
C: He [the seller] got a card from [an 
employee of the seller] thanking me 
for nothing. [Employees had 
previously complained they were 
underpaid while owner sold company 
for a lot of money. 
C: [Failure to] keep the intellectual 
history [people]…as soon as you 
walk from that you have a real 
problem. 
 
 
 
before they close the deal so they know what 
to expect. 
C: …fly out [immediately] to have a 
conversation with her [alleged sexual 
harassee]. 
B: Might want to bonus your guys, because 
they know you are making a ton of money. 
E: The thing you cannot get wrong is messing 
with people’s pay or benefits. 
BG: …if you can convince people in the 
company that you are going to be honest and 
truthful, and you actually demonstrate that 
with your actions, not just your words, its 
amazing what you can accomplish even in a 
difficult environment. 
B: It is impossible to overcommunicate. 
 
 
 
2.4 External 
Stakeholders 
A: Our main risk in our industry is 
with our suppliers.   
C: Debt holder might object to the 
sale of the company 
D: Communicate with… vendors, landlords, 
employees, where you can. 
A:  What happened in the last few 
acquisitions is the owner stayed and the 
company continues with the same name and 
the same invoices so the customers do not 
notice the difference. 
C: The first thing we did [after signing LOI] 
was we went to [noteholder] and said …we 
are going to pay you off, just work with us. 
3.1 Process 
Management 
D: Lack of proper, comprehensive, 
well thought out planning. 
D: If you don’t have those 
conversations those first three 
months [post-acquisition] they 
assume you are not watching. 
A: …the risks…are going to be 
workman’s comp claims, your health 
insurance claims and so forth.  
B: We weren’t really sure what we 
bought 
B: Their efforts to integrate our 
business were next to nil. The guy 
who was supposed to merge the 
business was in exactly one 
conversation. 
 
 
D: Identify the issues, mitigate the risks, that 
is how you can get things done. 
D: It all gets lost if you don’t capture it [info 
about the process] somewhere and have them 
coordinate with each other. 
A: If they have high [workers comp claims] 
the first thing we implement is safety 
programs. 
B: [Before the closing] we terminated 
everybody and hired the people we wanted.  
So we got around our management risk with 
no obligations for pensions, for whatever. 
B: …they went out and put a specific 
integration team on that business, so that it 
was handled properly. 
E: The due diligence team would transition 
over, largely, for the relevant people [to 
integration]. 
 
3.2 Integration 
Timing 
D: There was no planning done, 
caused anxiety 
A: We budget every line item…on a monthly 
basis. 
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D: Post-closing you’ve really gone 
negative in terms of shareholder 
value.  The period [immediately after 
the close] will determine whether 
value increases or decreases. 
C: One of the difficulties is that we 
weren’t really sure what we bought. 
C:[Buyer} said they were going to 
integrate the business and they didn’t 
have a plan. So without a plan … 
they just languished. 
E: People struggle with integration 
because they don’t plan. 
E: Integration is, quite simply, fanatical 
attention to detail. 
E: The approach we took was that due 
diligence was also integration planning. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Resources 
Shortfall 
D: Immediately after the 
closing…management is exhausted. 
A: Our overall [IT] legacy system is 
not where it needs to be, one of our 
concerns we are trying to address as 
we speak. 
C: One of the risks was that [the 
seller] would come and foreclose us 
as we were in breach of material 
covenants. We didn’t have any 
money. 
C:We didn’t have very deep pockets 
D: For the first three months, have a weekly 
call, go over the initiatives you have 
A: We have a management [integration] team, 
myself [CFO], the President of our company, 
the sales/general manager of the [home state] 
location, IT department. 
C: We managed [breach of material 
covenants] by maintaining good relationships 
with the [seller’s] CFO. 
C: They learned, they put the right resources 
on it. 
E: The due diligence team would transition 
over, largely, for the relevant people.   
 
3.4 Political 
Escalation 
BF: Not an alignment of vision 
among top management. 
BG: The new CEO had enormous 
power. He did not understand 
manufacturing, he was a retailer, but 
owners knew him… 
B:  So they started force-fitting to 
meet expectations. 
B: They fired the Chairman and 
CFO, and brought in a guy who was 
supposed to be a savior and gave him 
stupid incentives that insured its 
demise. 
A: The first thing we will do is… take the HR 
department with us. 
A: They will be on our HR program the day 
after we close. 
B:  …looking at the organic growth, what was 
possible in the business. 
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Appendix D:  Examples of Interview Questions 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with five senior managers.  The semi-
structured interview format included the following questions: 
1. Thinking about the mergers you have been involved with, or just the last few if 
that is easier, what risks do you believe threatened or could have threatened the success of the 
combined companies? 
 2.  Were there risks which were dealt with so early and quickly that they were not a 
problem, but in your experience could have become a threat if ignored? 
 3.  Thinking of the M&A process itself, were there risks relating to the management 
of the process, or the timing of the merger completion or integration?  Examples could include 
failure to plan for integration, moving process too fast… 
 4.  Have you had acquisitions which failed, either being abandoned before closing or 
closed and then merger did not live up to expectations?  If so, why abandoned or what caused the 
underperformance? 
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Appendix E:  Risk Analysis and Risk Prioritization in the Unity Case 
 
 In the risk analysis step, management evaluates the risks they have identified and assigns 
a rating for the likelihood and impact level for each risk area. We reviewed the Unity case to 
apply the risk analysis step of the framework. We reviewed the case and recorded the risks 
described by the managers in the case.  Based on the reported comments of management about 
the risks they faced, we developed an estimate of the risk probability (level) and an estimate of 
the loss (impact) on a scale of Low (1 point), Medium (2 points) and High (3 points).  We 
evaluated the number of mentions of different risks within a risk area, and noted the degree of 
impact they described. Where we did not get specific guidance from the managers’ comments, 
we made our best estimates of the level and impact of the losses. See Table 15 below for the 
values we derived from the managers’ comments.    
 It appears that if the framework had been used in the Unity case, it might have 
contributed to the risk management process. It may have helped management recognize and 
prioritize the risks by providing a risk list specific to the transaction. The use of the risk 
resolutions in the framework as added input to the risk resolution process may have helped Unity 
management in their risk management. For example, a manager on the integration team was 
aware that common reasons for disappointing acquisitions include poor organization fit and poor 
cultural fit.  However, when listing his integration priorities and discussing integration plans, he 
prioritized four areas with no further mention of these issues, and it appears they were not 
addressed.  Use of the framework may have caused his team to evaluate those risks level and 
impact of risk specifically for their integration so they could be addressed appropriately in risk 
management planning. 
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 In using the Unity case for an evaluation of the framework, we were limited by the 
information available in the case study. The case study was not written for our evaluation, so the 
focus and emphasis of the authors may not have made the case ideally suited for our evaluation.  
Since the framework was not used during the M&A process, but was applied by us retroactively, 
we were not able to evaluate how a management group might actually use the framework to 
guide or change their process. And we are not able to look back and see the results of the M&A 
process to determine the framework’s usefulness. 
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Table 14-1– Risk Analysis of Unity Case 
  
 
 
Risk Name 
 
 
 
Risk Definition 
 
 
 
Risk 
Level 
                
 
 
Impact 
of 
Risk 
 
 
 
Risk 
 Ex-
posure 
   L M H L M H  
1.1 Systems 
Compatibility 
 
Merging firms have practices, systems, 
reward systems or operating policies which 
are so incompatible integration problems 
are created. 
  x   x 9 
2.1 Customer 
Relationships 
Customer relationships are negatively 
impacted by the merger. 
  x   x 9 
3.3 Resources 
Shortfall 
There is insufficient slack, resources or 
skills to properly prosecute the integration 
program or realize expected benefits of the 
merger 
  x   x 9 
1.2 Integration Bias Integration decisions are dominated by one 
party or by limited business, technical or 
functional areas. 
 x    x 6 
3.2 Integration 
Timing 
Timeliness of the planning for and 
implementation of the integration is 
inadequate. 
  x  x  6 
2.3 Adverse 
 Behavior 
Employee behavior due to the merger 
process negatively impacts company 
performance during and after the merger 
process. 
 x   x  4 
3.1 Process 
Management 
Inadequate management action or 
leadership of the merger process leads to a 
significant departure from merger goals. 
 x   x  4 
3.4 Political 
Escalation 
Political struggles over which company’s 
management systems to use 
 x   x  4 
1.3 Organizational 
Culture 
Merger process or integration is hampered 
or resisted due to differences in corporate 
cultures. 
      0 
1.4 National Culture Merger process or integration is negatively 
impacted by differences in nationalities, 
language or culture. 
      0 
2.2 Contextual 
Ignorance 
Contexts outside the company are not 
adequately understood or are insufficiently 
attended to during the merger process. 
      0 
2.4 External 
Stakeholder 
Outside stakeholders do not support, 
understand or collaborate with the process. 
      0 
105 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Agrawal, A.; J.F. Jaffe and G.N. Mandelker. 1992. "The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring 
Firms: A Re-Examination of an Anomaly." Journal of Finance, pp. 1605-21. 
Aiello, R. J. and M. D. Watkins. 2000. "The Fine Art of Friendly Acquisition." Harvard Business 
Review 78(6), pp. 100-+. 
Alaranta, M and L Mathiassen. 2011. "Managing Risks in Post-Merger IS Integration." 
(Unpublished). 
Alberts, C. and A. Dorofee. 2010. "Risk Management Framework," In. Pittsburgh, PA: Software 
Engineering Institute. 
Alberts, C. J., & Dorofee, A. J. (2010). “Risk Management Framework” (No. CMU/SEI-2010-
TR-017). Carnegie-Mellon Univ Pittsburgh PA Software Engineering Institute. 
Al-Laham, A.; L. Schweizer and T. L. Amburgey. 2010. "Dating before Marriage? Analyzing 
the Influence of Pre-Acquisition Experience and Target Familiarity on Acquisition 
Success in the "M&a as R&D" Type of Acquisition." Scandinavian Journal of 
Management, 26(1), pp. 25-37. 
Allred, B. B.; K. B. Boal and W. K. Holstein. 2005. "Corporations as Stepfamilies: A New 
Metaphor for Explaining the Fate of Merged and Acquired Companies." Academy of 
Management Executive, 19(3), pp. 23-37. 
Ambrosini, V.; C. Bowman and R. Schoenberg. 2011. "Should Acquiring Firms Pursue More 
Than One Value Creation Strategy? An Empirical Test of Acquisition Performance." 
British Journal of Management, 22(1), pp. 173-85. 
Amihud, Y. and B. Lev. 1981. "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate 
Mergers." Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), pp. 605-17. 
Anderson, H.; V. Havila and A. Salmi. 2001. "Can You Buy a Business Relationship? On the 
Importance of Customer and Supplier Relationships in Acquisitions." Industrial 
Marketing Management, 30(7), pp. 575-86. 
Angwin, D. 2001. "Mergers and Acquisitions across European Borders: National Perspectives on 
Preacquisition Due Diligence and the Use of Professional Advisers." Journal of World 
Business, 36(1), pp. 32-57. 
Antila, E. M. 2006. "The Role of Hr Managers in International Mergers and Acquisitions: A 
Multiple Case Study." International Journal of Human Resource Management, 17(6), pp. 
999-1020. 
Appelbaum, S.H.; J. Gandell; H. Yortis; S. Proper and F. Jobin. 2000. "Anatomy of a Merger: 
Behavior of Organizational Factors and Processes Throughout the Pre-During-Post-
Stages (Part 1)." Management Decision, 38(9), pp. 649-62. 
Ashkanasy, N. M. and S. Holmes. 1995. "Perceptions of Organizational Ideology Following 
Merger - a Longitudinal-Study of Merging Accounting Firms." Accounting 
Organizations and Society, 20(1), pp. 19-34. 
Ashkenas, R.; S. Francis and R. Heinick. 2011. "The Merger Dividend." Harvard Business 
Review, 89(7-8), pp. 126-+. 
Ashkenas, R. N. and S. C. Francis. 2000. "Integration Managers: Special Leaders for Special 
Times." Harvard Business Review, 78(6), pp. 108-+. 
Asquith, P.; R. F. Bruner and D. W. Mullins Jr. 1983. "The Gains to Bidding Firms from 
Merger." Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1), pp. 121-39. 
106 
 
 
Azan, W. and I. H. Sutter. 2010. "Knowledge Transfer in Post-Merger Integration Management: 
Case Study of a Multinational Healthcare Company in Greece." Knowledge Management 
Research & Practice, 8(4), pp. 307-21. 
Baccarini, D. and R. Archer. 2001. "The Risk Ranking of Projects: A Methodology." 
International Journal of Project Management, 19(3), pp. 139-45. 
Bannert, V. and H. Tschirky. 2004. "Integration Planning for Technology Intensive 
Acquisitions." R & D Management, 34(5), pp. 481-94. 
Barkema, H. and M. Schijven. 2008. "How Do Firms Learn to Make Acquisitions? A Review of 
Past Research and an Agenda for the Future." Journal of Management, 34(3), pp. 594. 
Barney, J. B. 1988. "Returns to Bidding Firms in Mergers and Acquisitions: Reconsidering the 
Relatedness Hypothesis." Strategic Management Journal, 9(S1), pp. 71-78. 
Bastien, D. T.; T. J. Hostager and H. H. Miles. 1996. "Corporate Judo - Exploiting the Dark Side 
of Change When Competitors Merge, Acquire, Downsize, or Restructure." Journal of 
Management Inquiry, 5(3), pp. 261-75. 
Berger, A. N. and W. S. Frame. 2007. "Small Business Credit Scoring and Credit Availability." 
Journal of Small Business Management, 45(1), pp. 5-22. 
Bessembinder, H. and F. Zhang. 2012. "Firm Characteristics and Long-Run Stock Returns after 
Corporate Events." 
Bessembinder, H., & Zhang, F. (2013). Firm characteristics and long-run stock returns after 
corporate events. Journal of Financial Economics. 
Boehm, B.W. 1991. "Software Risk Management: Principles and Practices." Software, IEEE, 
8(1), pp. 32-41. 
Bradley, M., A. Desai, and E. Han Kim. "Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their 
division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms." Journal of financial 
Economics 21.1 (1988): 3-40. 
Brannen, M. Y. and M. F. Peterson. 2009. "Merging without Alienating: Interventions Promoting 
Cross-Cultural Organizational Integration and Their Limitations." Journal of International 
Business Studies, 40(3), pp. 468-89. 
Bruner, R.F. 2002. "Does M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker." Journal of 
Applied Finance, 12(1), pp. 48-68. 
Buono, A. F. 2003. "Seam-Less Post-Merger Integration Strategies: A Cause for Concern." 
Journal of Organizational Change Management, 16(1), pp. 90-98. 
Burgelman, R. A. and W. McKinney. 2006. "Managing the Strategic Dynamics of Acquisition 
Integration: Lessons from Hp and Compaq." California Management Review, 48(3), pp. 
6-+. 
Cagno, E.; F. Caron and M. Mancini. 2007. "A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Major Risks in 
Complex Projects." Risk Management, 9(1), pp. 1-18. 
Calori, R.; M. Lubatkin and P. Very. 1994. "Control Mechanisms in Cross-Border Acquisitions - 
an International Comparison." Organization Studies, 15(3), pp. 361-79. 
Capron, L. and J. Hulland. 1999. "Redeployment of Brands, Sales Forces, and General 
Marketing Management Expertise Following Horizontal Acquisitions: A Resource-Based 
View." Journal of Marketing, 63(2), pp. 41-54. 
Carr, V. and J. Tah. 2001. "A Fuzzy Approach to Construction Project Risk Assessment and 
Analysis: Construction Project Risk Management System." Advances in engineering 
software, 32(10-11), pp. 847-57. 
107 
 
 
Cartwright, S. and C.L. Cooper. 1996. Managing Mergers, Acquisitions and Strategic Alliances: 
Integrating People and Cultures. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Chapman, C. and S. Ward. 2000. "Estimation and Evaluation of Uncertainty: A Minimalist First 
Pass Approach." International Journal of Project Management, 18(6), pp. 369-83. 
Chapman, C. B. and S. Ward. 1997. Project Risk Management : Processes, Techniques, and 
Insights. Chichester ; New York: Wiley. 
Chapman, R.J. 1998. "The Effectiveness of Working Group Risk Identification and Assessment 
Techniques." International Journal of Project Management, 16(6), pp. 333-43. 
Charette, R. N. 1990. Applications Strategies for Risk Analysis. New York: Intertext 
Publications, Inc.,/McGraw-Hill, Inc.. 
Chatterjee, S. 2009. "The Keys to Successful Acquisition Programmes." Long Range Planning, 
42(2), pp. 137-63. 
Chatterjee, S. 1992. "Sources of Value in Takeovers: Synergy or Restructuring-Implications for 
Target and Bidder Firms." Strategic Management Journal, 13(4). 
Chatzkel, J. and H. Saint-Onge. 2007. "Quantum Leap Breakthrough Performance in 
Acquisitions - the Readiness and Generative Value Approach." Management Decision, 
45(9), pp. 1457-69. 
Chaudhuri, S. and B. Tabrizi. 1999. "Capturing the Real Value in High-Tech Acquisitions." 
Harvard Business Review, 77(5), pp. 123-30, 85. 
Chun, R. and G. Davies. 2010. "The Effect of Merger on Employee Views of Corporate 
Reputation: Time and Space Dependent Theory." Industrial Marketing Management, 
39(5), pp. 721-27. 
Colombo, G.; V. Conca; M. Buongiorno and L. Gnan. 2007. "Integrating Cross-Border 
Acquisitions: A Process-Oriented Approach." Long Range Planning, 40(2), pp. 202-22. 
Cullinan, G.; J. M. Le Roux and R. M. Weddigen. 2004. "When to Walk Away from a Deal." 
Harvard Business Review, 82(4), pp. 96-+. 
Das, T.K. and B.S. Teng. 1998. "Resource and Risk Management in the Strategic Alliance 
Making Process." Journal of Management, 24(1), pp. 21. 
Datta, D.K. 1991. "Organizational Fit and Acquisition Performance: Effects of Post Acquisition 
Integration." Strategic Management Journal, 12(4), pp. 281-97. 
Datta, D.K. and J.H. Grant. 1990. "Relationships between Type of Acquisition, the Autonomy 
Given to the Acquired Firm, and Acquisition Success: An Empirical Analysis." Journal 
of Management, 16(1), pp. 29-44. 
Davidoff, S. M. 2009. "The Failure of Private Equity." Southern California Law Review, 82(3), 
pp. 481-545. 
Davis, G.B. 1982. "Strategies for Information Requirements Determination." IBM Systems 
Journal, 21(1), pp. 4-30. 
Epstein, M.J. 2004. "The Drivers of Success in Post-Merger Integration." Organizational 
Dynamics, 33(2), pp. 174-89. 
Finkelstein, S. and J. Haleblian. 2002. "Understanding Acquisition Performance: The Role of 
Transfer Effects." Organization Science, 13(1), pp. 36-47. 
Gary, M. S. 2005. "Implementation Strategy and Performance Outcomes in Related 
Diversification." Strategic Management Journal, 26(7), pp. 643-64. 
Gates, S. and P. Very. 2003. "Measuring Performance During M&A Integration." Long Range 
Planning, 36(2), pp. 167-85. 
108 
 
 
Giessner, S. R. 2011. "Is the Merger Necessary? The Interactive Effect of Perceived Necessity 
and Sense of Continuity on Post-Merger Identification." Human Relations, 64(8), pp. 
1079-98. 
Gooding, R. Z. 1998. "Strategic Risk Analysis: When Bad Things Happen to Good Mergers." 
Financial Executive, 14, pp. 24-29. 
Graebner, M. E. 2004. "Momentum and Serendipity: How Acquired Leaders Create Value in the 
Integration of Technology Firms." Strategic Management Journal, 25(8-9), pp. 751-77. 
Greenwood, R.; C. R. Hinings and J. Brown. 1994. "Merging Professional Service Firms." 
Organization Science, 5(2), pp. 239-57. 
Haggerty, N. and J. Fong. 2009. "Unity Bank: Realizing Value Form an M&A Integration." Ivey 
Publishing, Case Study. 
Haleblian, J.; C.E. Devers; G. McNamara; M.A. Carpenter and R.B. Davison. 2009. "Taking 
Stock of What We Know About Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review and Research 
Agenda." Journal of Management, 35(3), pp. 469-502. 
Haleblian, J. and S. Finkelstein. 1999. "The Influence of Organizational Acquisition Experience 
on Acquisition Performance: A Behavioral Learning Perspective." Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 44(1), pp. 29-56. 
Hallikas, J.; I. Karvonen; U. Pulkkinen; V.M. Virolainen and M. Tuominen. 2004. "Risk 
Management Processes in Supplier Networks." International Journal of Production 
Economics, 90(1), pp. 47-58. 
Harris, E.P. 2007. "How Managers Construe Risk in Business Acquisitions." International 
Journal of Risk Assessment and Management, 7(8), pp. 1057-73. 
Haspeslagh, P.C. and D.B. Jemison. 1991. Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value through 
Corporate Renewal. Free Press New York. 
Hayward, M. L. A. and D. C. Hambrick. 1997. "Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large 
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris." Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1), pp. 
103-27. 
Heimeriks, K.H. and S. Gates. 2010. "Dow's Acquisition Program." Ivey Publishing, Case Study. 
Hitt, M.; J. Harrison; R.D. Ireland and A. Best. 1998. "Attributes of Successful and Unsuccessful 
Acquisitions of Us Firms." British Journal of Management, 9(2), pp. 91-114. 
Homburg, C. and M. Bucerius. 2005. "A Marketing Perspective on Mergers and Acquisitions: 
How Marketing Integration Affects Postmerger Performance." Journal of Marketing, 
69(1), pp. 95-113. 
Hubbard, N. 2001. Acquisition Strategy and Implementation. Purdue Univ Press. 
Irrmann, O. 2005. "Communication Dissonance and Pragmatic Failures in Strategic Processes: 
The Case of Cross-Border Acquisitions." Strategy Process, 22, pp. 251-66. 
Iversen, J.H.; L. Mathiassen and PA.. Nielsen. 2004. "Managing Risk in Software Process 
Improvement: An Action Research Approach." Mis Quarterly, 28(3), pp. 395-433. 
James, A. D.; L. Georghiou and J. S. Metcalfe. 1998. "Integrating Technology into Merger and 
Acquisition Decision Making." Technovation, 18(8-9), pp. 563-73. 
Jemison, DB.. and S.B. Sitkin. 1986. "Corporate Acquisitions: A Process Perspective." The 
Academy of Management Review, 11(1), pp. 145-63. 
Jenkinson, T. and R. Stucke. 2011. "Who Benefits from the Leverage in Lbos?" Available at 
SSRN 1777266. 
Keil, M.; P.E. Cule; K. Lyytinen and R.C. Schmidt. 1998. "A Framework for Identifying 
Software Project Risks." Communications of the ACM, 41(11), pp. 76-83. 
109 
 
 
King, D.R.; D.R. Dalton; C.M. Daily and J.G. Covin. 2004. "Meta-Analyses of Post-Acquisition 
Performance: Indications of Unidentified Moderators." Strategic Management Journal, 
25(2). 
Kitching, J. 1967. "Why Do Mergers Miscarry." Harvard Business Review, 45(6), pp. 84-101. 
Kreiner, K. and K. Lee. 2000. "Competence and Community: Post-Acquisition Learning 
Processes in High-Tech Companies." International Journal of Technology Management, 
20(5-8), pp. 657-69. 
Kumar, A.; D. P. Agrawal and S. D. Joshi. 2007. "Multiscale Neurofuzzy Models for Forecasting 
in Time Series Databases." International Journal of Wavelets Multiresolution and 
Information Processing, 5(6), pp. 859-78. 
Lakshman, C. 2011. "Postacquisition Cultural Integration in Mergers & Acquisitions: A 
Knowledge-Based Approach." Human Resource Management, 50(5), pp. 605-23. 
Lubatkin, M. 1983. "Mergers and the Performance of the Acquiring Firm." Academy of 
Management review, pp. 218-25. 
Lupina-Wegener, A. A.; S. C. Schneider and R. van Dick. 2011. "Different Experiences of 
Socio-Cultural Integration: A European Merger in Mexico." Journal of Organizational 
Change Management, 24(1), pp. 65-89. 
Lys, T. and L. Vincent. 1995. "An Analysis of Value Destruction in AT&T's Acquisition of 
NCR." Journal of Financial Economics, 39(2-3), pp. 353-78. 
Lyytinen, K.; L. Mathiassen and J. Ropponen. 1998. "Attention Shaping and Software Risk-a 
Categorical Analysis of Four Classical Risk Management Approaches." Information 
Systems Research, 9, pp. 233-55. 
MacCrimmon, K. R; D. A. Wehrung and W. T. Stanbury. 1986. Taking Risks: The Management 
of Uncertainty. New York: Free Press. 
Maire, S. and P. Collerette. 2011. "International Post-Merger Integration: Lessons from an 
Integration Project in the Private Banking Sector." International Journal of Project 
Management, 29(3), pp. 279-94. 
Malatesta, P. H. and R. Thompson. 1993. "Government-Regulation and Structural-Change in the 
Corporate Acquisitions Market - the Impact of the Williams Act." Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 28(3), pp. 363-79. 
March, J. G. and Z. Shapira. 1987. "Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking." 
Management Science, 33(11), pp. 1404-18. 
Marks, M.L. and P. Mirvis. 1985. "Merger Syndrome: Stress and Uncertainty." Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 20(2), pp. 50-55. 
Marks, M. L. and P. H. Mirvis. 2001. "Making Mergers and Acquisitions Work: Strategic and 
Psychological Preparation." Academy of Management Executive, 15(2), pp. 80-92. 
Marks, M. L. and R. Vansteenkiste. 2008. "Preparing for Organizational Death: Proactive HR 
Engagement in an Organizational Transition." Human Resource Management, 47(4), pp. 
809-27. 
Martynova, M. and L. Renneboog. 2008. "A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We 
Learned and Where Do We Stand?" Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(10), pp. 2148-77. 
Mathiassen, L.; T. Saarinen; T. Tuunanen and M. Rossi. 2007. "A Contingency Model for 
Requirements Development." Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 8(11), 
pp. 569-97. 
McKiernan, P. and Y. Merali. 1995. "Integrating Information-Systems after a Merger." Long 
Range Planning, 28(4), pp. 54-62. 
110 
 
 
McNamara, G. M.; J. Haleblian and B. J. Dykes. 2008. "The Performance Implications of 
Participating in an Acquisition Wave: Early Mover Advantages, Bandwagon Effects, and 
the Moderating Influence of Industry Characteristics and Acquirer Tactics." Academy of 
Management Journal, 51(1), pp. 113-30. 
Merna, T. and F.F. Al-Thani. 2008. Corporate Risk Management. Wiley. 
Merton, R. K. and P. L. Kendall. 1946. "The Focused Interview." American Journal of 
Sociology, pp. 541-57. 
Meyer, C. B. 2008. "Value Leakages in Mergers and Acquisitions: Why They Occur and How 
They Can Be Addressed." Long Range Planning, 41(2), pp. 197-224. 
Miles, S. A. and N. Bennett. 2008. "6 Steps to (Re)Building a Top Management Team." MIT 
Sloan Management Review, 50(1), pp. 60-+. 
Mohrman, S. A.; C. B. Gibson and A. M. Mohrman. 2001. "Doing Research That Is Useful to 
Practice a Model and Empirical Exploration." Academy of Management Journal, 44(2), 
pp. 357-75. 
Morrison, A. and D. Barnett. 2004. "Bombardier Transportation and the Adtranz Acquisition." 
Ivey Publishing, Case Study. 
Napier, N.K. 1989. "Mergers and Acquisitions, Human Resource Issues and Outcomes: A 
Review and Suggested Typology*." Journal of Management Studies, 26(3), pp. 271-90. 
Pablo, A.L. 1994. "Determinants of Acquisition Integration Level: A Decision-Making 
Perspective." Academy of Management Journal, 37(4), pp. 803-36. 
Pablo, A.L.; S.B. Sitkin and D.B. Jemison. 1996. "Acquisition Decision-Making Processes: The 
Central Role of Risk." Journal of Management, 22(5), pp. 723-46. 
Perry, J.S. and T.J. Herd. 2004. "Reducing M&A Risk through Improved Due Diligence." 
Strategy & Leadership, 32(2), pp. 12-19. 
Persson, J.S.; L. Mathiassen; J. Boeg; T.S. Madsen and F. Steinson. 2009. "Managing Risks in 
Distributed Software Projects: An Integrative Framework." Engineering Management, 
IEEE Transactions on, 56(3), pp. 508-32. 
Pettigrew, A. M. 1987. "Context and Action in the Transformation of the Firm." Journal of 
management studies, 24(6), pp. 649-70. 
Piekkari, R.; E. Vaara; J. Tienari and R. Santti. 2005. "Integration or Disintegration? Human 
Resource Implications of a Common Corporate Language Decision in a Cross-Border 
Merger." International Journal of Human Resource Management, 16(3), pp. 330-44. 
Pioch, E. 2007. "'Business as Usual?' - Retail Employee Perceptions of Organizational Life 
Following Cross-Border Acquisition." International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 18(2), pp. 209-31. 
PMBOK Guide, (2000), A guide to the project management body of knowledge: PMBOK guide, 
2nd edition, Pennsylvania, USA, Project Management Institute, Inc  
Porrini, P. 2004. "Can a Previous Alliance between an Acquirer and a Target Affect Acquisition 
Performance?" Journal of Management, 30(4), pp. 545-62. 
Porter, M. E. 1987. "From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Advantage." Harvard Business 
Review, 65(3), pp. 43-59. 
Raukko, M. 2009. "Organizational Commitment During Organizational Changes a Longitudinal 
Case Study on Acquired Key Employees." Baltic Journal of Management, 4(3), pp. 331-
52. 
Raz, T.; A.J. Shenhar and D. Dvir. 2002. "Risk Management, Project Success, and Technological 
Uncertainty." R&D Management, 32(2), pp. 101-09. 
111 
 
 
Reus, T. H. and B. T. Lamont. 2009. "The Double-Edged Sword of Cultural Distance in 
International Acquisitions." Journal of International Business Studies, 40(8), pp. 1298-
316. 
Riad, S. 2005. "The Power of Organizational Culture as a Discursive Formation in Merger 
Integration." Organization Studies, 26(10), pp. 1529. 
Rosenbloom, A.H. 2002. Due Diligence for Global Deal Making: The Definitive Guide to Cross-
Border Mergers and Acquisitions, Joint Ventures, Financings, and Strategic Alliances. 
Bloomberg Pr. 
Santomero, A.M. and D.F. Babbel. 1997. "Financial Risk Management by Insurers: An Analysis 
of the Process." Journal of Risk and Insurance, pp. 231-70. 
Schein, E.H. 1990. "Organizational Culture." American Psychologist, 45(2), pp. 109. 
Schweiger, D.M. and A.S. DeNisi. 1991. "Communication with Employees Following a Merger: 
A Longitudinal Field Experiment." Academy of Management Journal, pp. 110-35. 
Schweiger, D.M.; J.M. Ivancevich and F.R. Power. 1987. "Executive Actions for Managing 
Human Resources before and after Acquisition." The Academy of Management 
Executive (1987-1989), pp. 127-38. 
Seijts, G. H. and K. Mark. 2004. "Deloitte and Touche:Integrating Arthur Andersen." Ivey 
Publishing, Case Study. 
Shanley, M. T. and M. E. Correa. 1992. "Agreement between Top Management Teams and 
Expectations for Post Acquisition Performance." Strategic Management Journal, 13(4), 
pp. 245-66. 
Shaver, J. M. 2006. "A Paradox of Synergy: Contagion and Capacity Effects in Mergers and 
Acquisitions." Academy of Management review, 31(4), pp. 962-76. 
Shojai, S. 2009. "Economists' Hubris - the Case of Mergers and Acquisitions." Journal of 
Financial Transformation, Vol. 26, pp. 4-12, 2009. 
Shrivastava, P. 1986. "Postmerger Integration." Journal of Business Strategy, 7(1), pp. 65-76. 
Sitkin, S.B. and A.L. Pablo. 2005. "The Neglected Importance of Leadership in Mergers and 
Acquisitions." Mergers and acquisitions: Managing culture and human resources, pp. 
208. 
____. 1992. "Reconceptualizing the Determinants of Risk Behavior." Academy of Management 
review, 17(1), pp. 9-38. 
Slowinski, G.; Z. E. Rafii; J. C. Tao; L. Gollob; M. W. Sagal and K. Krishnamurthy. 2002. 
"After the Acquisition: Managing Paranoid People in Schizophrenic Organizations." 
Research-Technology Management, 45(3), pp. 21-32. 
Stylianou, A. C.; C. J. Jeffries and S. S. Robbins. 1996. "Corporate Mergers and the Problems of 
Is Integration." Information & Management, 31(4), pp. 203-13. 
Teerikangas, S.; P. Very and V. Pisano. 2011. "Integration Managers' Value-Capturing Roles and 
Acquisition Performance." Human Resource Management, 50(5), pp. 651-83. 
Tetenbaum, T. J. 1999. "Beating the Odds of Merger & Acquisition Failure: Seven Key Practices 
That Improve the Chance for Expected Integration and Synergies." Organizational 
Dynamics, 28(2), pp. 22-36. 
Toschi, L; E Bolognesi; F Angeli and VC di Lucca. 2007. "A Meta-Analytic Answer to an Old 
Dilemma: Do M&As Create Value? Evidence from European Banks," In 2007 Academy 
of Management Annual Meeting. 
112 
 
 
Tranfield, D.; D. Denyer and P. Smart. 2003. "Towards a Methodology for Developing Evidence 
Informed Management Knowledge by Means of Systematic Review." British Journal of 
Management, 14(3), pp. 207-22. 
Vaara, E. 2003. "Post-Acquisition Integration as Sensemaking: Glimpses of Ambiguity, 
Confusion, Hypocrisy, and Politicization." Journal of Management Studies, 40(4), pp. 
859-94. 
Vaara, E. and P. Monin. 2010. "A Recursive Perspective on Discursive Legitimation and 
Organizational Action in Mergers and Acquisitions." Organization Science, 21(1), pp. 3-
22. 
Van de Ven, A.H. 2007. Engaged Scholarship: A Guide for Organizational and Social Research. 
Oxford University Press, USA. 
Van der Marel, H. 2011. "The Role of IT Networks in Mergers and Acquisitions." Management 
of Technology Master Thesis. 
Vermeulen, F. 2005. "How Acquisitions Can Revitalize Companies." MIT Sloan Management 
Review, 46(4), pp. 45-+. 
Vester, J. 2002. "Lessons Learned About Integrating Acquisitions." Research-Technology 
Management, 45(3), pp. 33-41. 
Wallace, L. and M. Keil. 2004. "Software Project Risks and Their Effect on Outcomes." 
Communications of the ACM, 47(4), pp. 68-73. 
Weber, R. A. and C. F. Camerer. 2003. "Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental 
Approach." Management Science, 49(4), pp. 400-15. 
Weber, Y. 1996. "Corporate Cultural Fit and Performance in Mergers and Acquisitions." Human 
Relations, 49(9), pp. 1181-202. 
Weber, Y.; S. Y. Tarba and Z. R. Bachar. 2011. "Mergers and Acquisitions Performance 
Paradox: The Mediating Role of Integration Approach." European Journal of 
International Management, 5(4), pp. 373-93. 
Webster, J. and R.T. Watson. 2002. "Analyzing the Past to Prepare for the Future: Writing a 
Literature Review." Management Information Systems Quarterly, 26(2), pp. 3. 
Wiklund, J. and D. A. Shepherd. 2009. "The Effectiveness of Alliances and Acquisitions: The 
Role of Resource Combination Activities." Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(1), 
pp. 193-212. 
Yin, R.K. 2008. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage Publications, Inc. 
Yu, J. S.; R. M. Engleman and A. H. Van de Ven. 2005. "The Integration Journey: An Attention-
Based View of the Merger and Acquisition Integration Process." Organization Studies, 
26(10), pp. 1501-28. 
Zhang, Y. F.; D. Fleet; Y. J. Shi; J. S. Srai and M. Gregory. 2010. "Network Integration for 
International Mergers and Acquisitions." European Journal of International Management, 
4(1-2), pp. 56-78. 
Zollo, M. 2009. "Superstitious Learning with Rare Strategic Decisions: Theory and Evidence 
from Corporate Acquisitions." Organization Science, 20(5), pp. 894-908. 
Zollo, M. and H. Singh. 2004. "Deliberate Learning in Corporate Acquisitions: Post-Acquisition 
Strategies and Integration Capability in Us Bank Mergers." Strategic Management 
Journal, 25(13), pp. 1233-56. 
 
 
 
113 
 
 
VITA 
 
 
Robert W. Heller was born in Missouri, and lived in Pennsylvania, Illinois, California 
and New York before moving to Atlanta. He holds a B.S. in Economics with concentrations in 
Finance and Accounting from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and an 
MBA from the University of Southern California. He has recently completed an Executive 
Doctorate in Business Administration at Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia.   
During his career he has held a number of investment and management positions. These 
include equity analysis and fixed income portfolio management at Pacific Mutual, investment 
banking at Bear Stearns, Richard Weingarten & Co., and Arden Partners, Inc., and private equity 
investing at Richards Capital and Southern Equity Partners, LLC.  He has taught as an adjunct 
instructor in finance at California State University – Fullerton, and Clayton State College. He 
most recently taught finance and economics at Georgia College and State University.  He is a 
Chartered Financial Analyst.  His research interests include behavioral finance, entrepreneurship 
and mergers and acquisitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
